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Introduction  
 
Scottish Water is a public corporation1 responsible for delivering water and sewerage 
services in Scotland. It was created in 2002 under the Water Industry Act (Scotland), 
which amalgamated the three water boards2 who were previously responsible for 
delivering water services in the North, East and West of Scotland.  
 
This report examines the regulatory environment which governs Scottish Water and 
recent changes in policy and regulation in the Scottish Water sector.3 The regulatory 
framework in Scotland is similar to the privatised system in England. It is in many 
respects a 'marketised' system that prioritises notions of market efficiency as the key 
driver of activity in the water sector. We argue that this produces very different 
outcomes than those systems guided by the values of public or social ownership of 
water.  
 
We provide a detailed examination of the role, responsibilities and orientation of the 
Water Industry Commission for Scotland (WIC), the key regulator in the Scottish 
Water sector.  We show how the approach of the WIC and the regulatory framework 
operating in Scotland is in line with international trends, which have increasingly 
tended to prioritise the role of the market and privatisation. The legislation that 
established Scottish Water allowed for private sector involvement in the capital 
investment programme in the water industry in Scotland. This led to the formation of 
Scottish Water Solutions, a joint venture between Scottish Water and private 
companies. 
 
The latter half of the report focuses on the policy options facing Scottish Water, 
which include privatisation, mutualisation or democratisation and evaluates which is 
likely to safeguard the public interest and the sustainability of water to the Scottish 
public.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 A public corporation is defined as being ‘an industrial or commercial enterprise under direct 
Government Control; has a board whose members are appointed by Ministers, and which meets at least 
quarterly; employ their own staff, who are not civil servants; and manage their own budgets’. (Scottish 
Executive, 2002:9) 
2 East, West and North of Scotland Water 
3  This report was commissioned by the Scottish Trades Union Congress on behalf of the Trades 
Unions working in the Scottish Water Industry. 
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Background 
 
Water and sewerage services in Scotland are delivered by Scottish Water, a publicly 
owned company which 'aims to be as efficient and effective as water companies in the 
private sector'4. Its main functions are to provide clean water to 2.2 million 
households and 133,000 non-domestic (i.e. mainly business) properties; and to treat 
wastewater across an area one third of the size of Britain. Scottish Water is now the 
single provider of water services to Scotland’s 5 million population, and the fourth-
largest in the UK.5 In 2005/06 its turnover was £1,019 million6 and total fixed assets 
in 2006 were £3,255.4 million.7 Scottish Water is a public utility run like a private 
company. It has sought to cut costs by reducing its workforce by 35%8 since the 
creation of the corporation in 2002, whilst increasing its investment programme.  At 
the same time as these job losses the top management team at Scottish Water have 
earned exorbitant bonuses for a more ‘effective’ service.9  Should they outperform the 
objectives set by Ministers over the next 4 years the management team of Scottish 
Water will earn in excess of £170,000 each.10  
 
In 1989 the water sector in England and Wales was privatised. Scotland’s water and 
sewerage operations remained, and have continued to remain, in public hands. That 
said this has not been a smooth ride for a publicly owned water industry in Scotland. 
In 1995 Scottish local authorities were reorganised by the then Conservative 
Government. This restructuring initially included plans to privatise water and 
sewerage agencies that were then under local authority control. These proposals were 
met by a widespread campaign against water privatisation. A referendum on the issue 
in March 1994, organised by Strathclyde Regional Council, saw 71% of the eligible 
electorate vote (1.2 million ballots). The result was emphatic: 97% rejected water 
privatisation. Opinion polls across Scotland at the time registered similar levels of 
opposition to plans to take water ownership out of the public sector.11 Faced with such 
widespread hostility to these plans the Conservative administration opted to 
restructure water regulation in Scotland by creating three authorities to assume 
responsibility for water from the regional councils. 
 
This report examines a wide variety of literature and policy documentation on the 
global water system and the policy context in Scotland.  We assess the evidence 
provided by the industry and its regulators as well as the main policy options found in 
the literature.  Our analysis suggests that those siren voices proposing privatisation or 
                                                 
4 Scottish Water,  About Us, (2006)  
http://www.scottishwater.co.uk/portal/page?_pageid=225,483511&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL  
5 See Appendix 1 for further details. 
6 Scottish Water (2006) Annual Report and Accounts 2005/2006, Financial and Business Review, p. 28 
(http://www.scottishwater.co.uk/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/SWE_PGP_NEWS/0606%20-
%20JUNE%202006/SWE_NEWS_AREPORT06/PRINTED%20ANNUAL%20REPORT.PDF)  
7 Ibid p,29 
8 ibid., p. 31. 
9 Hutcheon, P, ‘Scottish Water bosses to net GBP1m in new bonus scheme’,  The Sunday Herald, 
September 3 2006;  p,7 
10 ibid 
11 System Three Scotland, ‘General Public's Attitudes on Government's Proposals for Water and 
Sewerage Services’, 11 November 1995.  
Anderson Crooks, K (1996) ‘Water Warfare in Scotland: A Case Study in Issues Management’.  
(http://list.msu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind9612d&L=aejmc&T=0&P=6455)  
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mutualisation as the solution to the problems of the Scottish water industry are largely 
mistaken in their analysis.  The evidence we quote shows how the system of 
governance in which the Scottish water industry operates is a marketised  system.  
The operation of the system tend will inevitably increase the political and economic 
pressures for privatisation of the industry.  We show however that neither 
privatisation - nor its near cousin mutualisation - will prove an efficient or sustainable 
future for the industry.  On the contrary the most efficient, cheapest and sustainable 
future for the industry is to keep it in public hands in the context of a serious re-
democratisation. 
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Part 1 Water Policy: Trends in Governance and Regulation 
The International context  
 
Global water: scarcity and inequality 
Globally water is a resource that is in crisis. Barlow and Clarke state that the hard 
news is ‘humanity is depleting, diverting and polluting the planet’s fresh water 
resources so quickly that every species on earth - including our own – is in mortal 
danger.  The earths water is finite’.12 The UN Economic and Social Council observe 
that this crisis is due to ‘increased demand for finite water resources, contamination of 
water supplies and degradation of eco-systems’, not to mention climate change. 
Furthermore, underlying these factors are ‘continuing population growth, 
urbanization, industrialization and intensification of agriculture’.13 It is unsurprising 
therefore that in 1995 Ismail Serageldin, vice president of the World Bank, should 
make his now famous prediction, that ‘if the wars of this century were fought over oil, 
the wars of the next century will be fought over water”.14 
In addition water inequality is on the rise. The UN estimated that in 1995 1.76 billion 
people (out of an approximate 5.7 billion population) were living under sever water 
stress.15  And, that in 2025 it is estimated that about two thirds of the world’s 
population, about 5.5 billion people, will live in areas facing moderate to severe water 
stress.16  This is hardly unsurprising given that water-use increased six-fold during the 
twentieth century, more than twice the rate of population growth and that as a 
consequence in some parts of the world, for example the USA, India and China, 
groundwater is being consumed faster than it is being replenished.17  What's more 
today in the world 1.1billion people, or 18% of the world’s population, lack access to 
clean water.  About 2.6 billion people lack access to basic sanitation.  More than 
2.2million people, mostly in developing countries, die each year from diseases 
associated with poor water and sanitary conditions, while every week an estimated 
42,000 people die from diseases related to low quality drinking water and lack of 
sanitation. Over 90 per cent of them occur to children under the age of 5.18  
It was in the knowledge of these statistics that the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) in 2002 set Millenium Develoment Goals (MDG’s) to halve 
the proportion of those without clean drinking water and adequate sanitation by 2015. 
In December 2003 the UN general assembly proclaimed the decade 2005-2015 as the 
International decade for action “Water for Life”.  The aim to stop the “Unsustainable 
exploitation of water resources”, while the major themes are “scarcity, access to 
sanitation to health, water and gender, capacity building, financing, valuation, 
                                                 
12 Barlow, M. and Clarke, Blue Gold: The Battle against Corporate theft of the Worlds Water, 
Earthscan Publications Ltd,  2003, p,5 
13 ‘Freshwater management: progress in meeting the goals, targets and commitments of Agenda 21, the 
programme for further implementation of Agenda 21, and the Johannesburg plan of implementation’ 
UN Economic and Social Council 11th February 2004 
14 Shiva, V,  Water, Wars: Pollution, profits and privatization, Pluto Press, 2002, ix 
15 ‘International Decade for action, Water for life 2005-2015 Factsheet on water and sanitation’ UN – 
Water, 2005 http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/factsheets.html  
16 ibid 
17 ibid 
18 WHO/UNICEF 'Water for Life', (2005) http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/waterforlife.pdf 
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integrated water resources management, trans-boundary water issues, environment 
and bio-diversity, disaster prevention, food and agriculture, pollution and energy19.   
The issues outlined in the UN Water for Life campaign are relevant to all parts of the 
world, rich and poor, north and south, first and third.  Therefore, it is reasonable to 
state that how water is governed is of vital importance everywhere.  Yet how to 
govern water so as to ensure the fulfilment of the MDG’s and in a fair, equitable, 
affordable and sustainable way in both wealthy and poor countries has sparked much 
dispute and disagreement.  The scarcity of water and the issues around governance 
have encouraged the commodification of water and pressure to deal with issues of 
supply and governance by market mechanisms.   
The ‘Washington Consensus’ 
Since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the market has reigned triumphant. Market 
principles and market rules are now dominant the world over and globalisation has 
accelerated as new markets have opened up, services have been commodified and 
capital can move freely and unhindered.  This change has been termed the 
‘Washington Consensus’ or neo-liberalism.  Cox summarises the Washington 
Consensus as the ‘privatisation of the means of production, deregulation of all 
economic activity, encouragement of competition and balanced budgets’.20  Hobden 
and Wyn Jones say that the set of policies most closely associated with the neo-liberal 
project is a reduction in state spending, currency devaluation, privatisation and the 
promotion of free markets.21   A leader in this global transformation was the UK 
Conservative Governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major.  Heffernan states 
that Thatcherism (neo-liberalism) was ‘an ideological project and a vehicle which 
advanced a post social democratic neo-liberal order’.22  This manifested itself through 
a rejection of state collectivism and universal welfare provision, public ownership and 
state intervention.  Instead they believed in low taxation, less public spending, less 
public borrowing, limited government, privatisation and deregulation of business.23     
 
According to Leys the consequences for democracy of this transformation are 
sobering.  
  
The power of market forces, whether affecting macro-economic policy 
generally through the financial markets, or micro-economic policy through 
pressure from TNC’s and their home governments, has greatly increased and 
the autonomy of most states – except perhaps the USA or oil rich states like 
Saudi Arabia- has greatly declined.  National policy making is now 
pervasively influenced by this new circumstance.24 
 
 
                                                 
19 ‘Water for life’ UN,  http://www.waterforlifedecade/ 
20 Cox, M, ‘International history since 1989’ in Baylis, J, & Smith, S, ‘The Globalisation of World 
Politics’, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001  p,120 
21 Hobden, S, and Wynn Jones, R, ‘Marxist theories of International Relations’ in Baylis, J, & Smith, S, 
‘The Globalisation of World Politics’, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001 p,213 
22 Heffernan, R, ‘New Labour and Thatcherism; Political change in Britain’, Macmillan Press, 
Basingstoke, 2000 p,18 
23 ibid 
24 Leys, C, ‘Market Driven Politics, Neo-Liberal Democracy and The public interest’, Verso, London, 
2003, p, 25 
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Water in the Neo-Liberal era: Commodity or human right? 
Despite the pressing water crisis, or possibly because of it, the dominant attitude 
amongst the major countries and international institutions, like the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, EU, World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the 
European Union (EU) is to solve it through market mechanisms. This dominance 
declares Barlow comes down to,  
 
Economic freedom, not democracy or ecological stewardship, being the 
defining metaphor of the post-cold war period for those in power... In this 
global market economy, everything is now up for sale, even areas of life once 
considered sacred, such as health and education, culture and heritage, genetic 
codes and seeds and natural resources, including water.25  
 
Joseph Stiglitz, for 4 years an advisor to President Bill Clinton and then 3 years a 
Chief Economist at the World Bank, writes of how : 
 
At the IMF, decisions were made on the basis of what seemed a curious blend 
of ideology and bad economics, dogma that sometimes seemed to be thinly 
veiling special interests’. And, that ‘ideology guided policy prescription and 
countries were expected to follow the IMF guidelines without debate’ and that 
these ‘did not just produce bad results; they were undemocratic.26  
 
Shiva writes that ‘not only has the World Bank played a major role in the creation of 
water scarcity and pollution, it is now transforming that scarcity into a market 
opportunity for water corporations’.27  The idea of policy being guided by ideology, 
through organisations like the World Bank is not irrelevant to Scotland: especially 
when one considers the links between that organisation and the WIC (See Appendix 
6)   
 
This ideological direction is also demonstrated by the conditions imposed on loans or 
aid. As Shiva states ‘It is common for the World Bank and IMF to demand water 
deregulation as part of their lending conditions.  Out of the 40 IMF loans disbursed 
through the International Finance Corporation in 2000, 12 had requirements for full or 
partial privatisation’.28 Indeed the British Government is also complicit in this 
promotion of privatised water supply in some of the worlds poorest countries.29  
Though this is a scrutiny of global policies by global institutions it once again informs 
us of the global and national terrain in which Scotland is situated.  Moreover, it is 
important to position Scotland in this background as it is clear that within the current 
globalised and national political and economic landscape Scotland is as exposed to 
these influences as anywhere. 
 
                                                 
25 Barlow, M, and Clarke, T  ‘Blue Gold: The Battle against corporate theft of the Worlds Water’, 
Earhscan Publications Ltd, 2003, p,81 
26 Stiglitz, J., Globalisation and its discontents, Penguin Books, London, 2002 p,XIII-XIV  
27 Shiva, V, ‘Water, Wars: Pollution, profits and privatization’, Pluto Press, 2002, p,87 
 
28 Ibid, p92 
29 ‘Dirty Aid, Dirty Water The UK Government’s push to Privatise water and sanitation in poor 
countries’, World Development Movement, February 2005 
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The solution proffered to the impending water crisis is to introduce market principles 
to its operation and supply. This solution was espoused by the Dublin UN conference 
in 1992 and has subsequently been taken up by dominant organisations like the UN 
Council for Sustainable Development, the EU and influential corporate lobby groups 
like the World Water Council (WWC), the Global Water Partnership and Aquafed. 
They were also instrumental in setting up ‘The Report of the World Panel on 
Financing Water Infrastructure’ called ‘Financing Water For All’.  This report was 
charged with forming ‘a panel of experts to address the ways and means of attracting 
new financial resources to the water field’.30   Unsurprisingly, since the panel was 
made up almost exclusively of financiers, World Bank officials and representatives 
from Water TNC’s they were pragmatic about where finance should come from and 
welcomed private sector involvement.  They emphasised that this was necessary to 
assist in the implementation of the MDG’s.31  Nothing though was said of how much 
of a business opportunity this was for Water TNC’s.  Though the World Bank had 
previously estimated the potential water market at $1trillion and Fortune magazine 
identified the water ‘business’ as the most profitable (service) for investors.32   
 
If Scotland increasingly sees water as commodity and an economic good, rather than a 
fundamental human right, at the same time as there is water scarcity elsewhere then it 
is clear that the temptation will be to sell some of Scotland’s plentiful water supply.  
This would result in selling more than is being replenished, therefore potentially 
jeopardising water sustainability, whilst simultaneously pushing prices up.             
 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services is an attempt to open up service 
provision to the market.  This means that governments can be prosecuted by the WTO 
for disallowing private sector attempts at the running of essential and public services. 
According to a paper from CEO ‘The specific function of the GATS within the 
unholy trinity of the IF, World Bank, and the WTO is not only to deepen the existing 
level of liberalisation that has already been imposed but to legally bind it; ie, to lock 
in that liberalisation and to make it irreversible’33.  However, they add, in terms of 
water there has been a co-ordinated and concerted campaign against privatisation.  In 
the EU this saw retreats from particular governments EG Belgium and Norway and 
the Water TNC’s themselves who were fearful of the bad publicity received as a 
consequence of attempts to force water as a part of GATS.34  Hence, in late February 
the European Commission announced that they would exempt water from the new 
plurilateral General Agreement on Trade In Services (GATS).35 This was seen by 
many as a retreat from privatisation and moreover an admission of doubt at the private 
sector’s ability to meet the MDG’s.   
 
Even the industry recognises the enormity of the task of meeting the MDG’s and the 
inability of the private sector to meet them.  In January 2002, for instance, J.F Talbot, 
Chief Executive of Saur International, the fourth biggest water company in the world, 
                                                 
30 Camdessus, M, et al  ‘Report of the World Panel on Financing Water Infrastructure, Financing Water 
for All’, (2003), vii 
31 ibid 
32 Shiva, V, Water, Wars: Pollution, profits and privatization, Pluto Press, 2002,  p,88 
33 Derkwith, C,  ‘Water almost out of GATS’ A Corporate European Observatory Briefing, 2006 
34 Ibid, p,3 
35 Ibid, p,1 
35  Hall, D, ‘Financing water for the world– an alternative to guaranteed profits’, March 2003, 
(http://www.psiru.org/reports/2003-03-W-finance.doc)  
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referred to the huge scale of the needs and how necessary water was for sustainable 
development but openly asked ‘is it a good and attractive business?  He also said that 
the private sector simply does not have the financial capacity as the ‘scale of the need 
far out-reaches the financial and risk-taking capacities of the private sector’.36 The 
question of risk is a key one for the private water companies.  Where they have failed 
it has been a consequence of them failing to meet the expectations of the consumer in 
terms of service, cost and capital investment while simultaneously still making 
money, which is the legal obligation of any water company.  Thus, taking the risk out 
of investments in water is a prime focus of the water companies.  Taking the risk out 
of the water business for water companies has included lobbying for soft loans, grants 
and subsidies, entering into PPP contracts (where they have guaranteed contracts but 
ultimate ownership and risk lies with the state) and mutualisation.  In these cases the 
risk lies with the owners of the assets: namely the members/public.   Given this 
context of global water scarcity it is clear that how water is governed is fundamental 
to its supply and sustainability.  
    
It is reasonable to assume that in the third world the water companies have found it 
difficult to square the circle of ensuring massive investment to address years of none 
or little investment while simultaneously making it affordable and equitable and at the 
same time satisfy their shareholders.  As a consequence many of the main private 
operators have collapsed through their realization that they could not fulfil their 
obligations and public protest due to ineffectual service and escalating cost.  This has 
led to the cancellation of contracts in places like Cochabamba in Bolivia, Buenos 
Aries, Grenoble in France, Jakarta and many more.  The effect of this has seen a 
calculated retreat by the private water companies.  The concern being that ‘their 
expansion plans are now focusing on the potentially most profitable markets in 
Europe, the US, Canada and Japan’.37  Clearly Scottish Water, with its plentiful 
supply, markedly smaller workforce, existing market organisation and the huge 
investment currently being made to improve its infrastructure may be an attractive 
acquisition for the private firms currently beating a tactical retreat from the third 
world.  
 
The pressure to involve the private sector in the Scottish Water industry comes from 
the International Financial Institutions and the Trans-National water corporations.  
These pressures can either be acceded to by elected politicians or resisted.  The next 
section shows that in Scotland, the pressures to marketise have not been resisted. 
                                                 
 
 
37 Brennen et al, ‘Reclaiming Public Water, Participatory alternatives to Water privatisation’ TNI 
Briefing Series No 2004/7, (2004),  p,4 
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Water Policy in Scotland: Legislation 
 
In practice, the restructuring of the Scottish water industry has meant an incremental 
increase in private involvement in Scottish Water. Academic analyses of 
contemporary governance have found that private involvement has increased in all 
areas of government even when it is unpopular with the people. Rhodes (1997) 
observes that the UK government has introduced ‘quasi-markets through purchase-
provider splits when services could not be privatised’.38 Teeple, (2000), notes that 
'where the process is politically problematic the preferred route has been privatisation 
by attrition and the gradual reduction of services’.39 This very process is underway in 
Scotland. 
 
Devolution has had a significant impact on the governance of water in Scotland.  
There have been three Acts of the Scottish Parliament passed since the start of 
Devolution. The 2002 and 2005 Acts, in particular, have encouraged and facilitated 
both private sector involvement and practices into the publicly owned Scottish Water 
Industry.    
 
Water Industry (Scotland) Act 2002  
 
• This Act restructured the industry; creating the new regulatory framework to 
ensure effectiveness in both customer service and cost, and fulfilment of all 
Scottish Water’s statutory obligations. 
 
• This legislation established the WIC as a ministerial advisor. This advisory role 
was highly significant. The general functions of the Commissioner were that 
'Scottish Ministers may, after consulting the commissioner, give the commissioner 
directions of a general or specific character as to the exercise of the 
commissioner’s functions; and the commissioner must comply with any such 
direction'.40  
 
• The advisory role for the WIC was pivotal. The Scottish Executive set policy 
objectives for Scottish Water.  Under this framework the WIC suggested revenue 
limits for Scottish Water to Scottish Ministers for a strategic review period 
(currently 4 years). Scottish Ministers then approved, rejected or amended WIC 
advice. Scottish Water annually proposed a charges scheme which the WIC 
approved with or without agreed amendments. If no agreement was reached, 
Ministers decided the charges scheme. 
  
• This Act also created the Drinking Water Quality Regulator (DWQR) and the 
Water Customer Consultation Panels, Scotland (WCCPS).  SEPA was the other 
regulator within water regulatory framework.  For a summation of their roles see 
Appendix 6. 
 
                                                 
38 Rhodes, R.A.W. Understanding Governance, Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and 
Accountability, Buckingham, Open University Press, 1997, p,16 
39 Teeple, G, Globalization and the decline of social reform, Aurora, Garamond Press, (2000), p,95 
40 Scottish Executive Water Industry (Scotland) Act 2002 Part 1, section 1, paragraph 3. 
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• The act also paved the way for Scottish Water to enter into joint ventures with 
private partners in providing water services in Scotland.  This led to the formation 
of Scottish Water Solutions (SWS), who build and operate much of the new 
investment in the Scottish Water Industry.41   
 
• The Water Industry Act (Scotland) Act 2002 also created a tripartite structure 
whereby the Scottish Executive set Ministerial Objectives. The Water Industry 
Commissioner (WIC) advised on the costing and prices for the Ministerial 
Objectives, whilst Scottish Water then implemented the Ministerial Objectives at 
the price that was set by the WIC. Ministers are advised on the objectives by a 
group of stakeholders known as the Water Industry Objectives Group (WIOG).  
This is made up of the regulators and business interests such as the CBI and 
housebuilders as well as COSLA.  There are no Trade Unions or Environmental 
organisations represented.  
 
Water Environment and Water Services (Scotland) Act 2003 
 
• This was essentially the Scottish legislative response to ‘The EU Water 
Framework Directive - integrated river basin management for Europe’42.  The 
Scottish Executive were statutorily obliged to implement this Act.  
 
 
Water Services (Scotland) Act 2005 
 
• This legislation enacted potentially profoundly important modifications of the 
regulatory framework. It replaced the Water Industry Commissioner with a Water 
Industry Commission for Scotland comprising six members43 and was given 
statutory powers.  These resulted in the WIC now setting the budgets for Scottish 
Water to meet the objectives for water services in Scotland set by Ministers.  This 
has, arguably, significantly curtailed the ability of the Parliament and the 
Executive to influence water services in Scotland.   
 
• The act enhanced the statutory powers of the Water Customer Consultation Panels 
Scotland (now Waterwatch Scotland), the customer representative body.  It did so 
by transferring the transfer of the complaints procedure from the WIC to 
Waterwatch. Despite having powers over customer representation given to 
Waterwatch the WIC still plays a critical role in this process as Waterwatch must 
make their representations on behalf of customers through the WIC 
 
The WIC now determines the charge limits for Scottish Water based on its assessment 
of the total revenue needs of Scottish Water. Disagreements between Scottish Water 
and the Water Industry Commission can now lead to appeals to the Competition 
Commission. The Competition Commission is a UK organisation. Thus accountability 
for Scottish Water has been taken further away from the Scottish Parliament and 
                                                 
41 For a profile of the different private actors involved and the managerial structure of SWS, see 
appendix 3. 
42 ‘The EU Water Framework Directive - integrated river basin management for Europe’ 
(http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-framework/index_en.html)  
43 The new Chief Executive is the former Commissioner Alan Sutherland. 
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people. There are serious concerns regarding this, voiced prominently by the STUC 
during the consultation process. As they noted, the Competition Commission:  
 
were simply not qualified to play that role in relation to a public service such 
as Scottish Water, which has clear political direction in relation to public 
policy.  A political question arises as to whether it is the right for the 
judgments in relation to the balance between economic efficiency and public 
policy considerations to be arbitrated by a bunch of economists sitting in 
London.44   
 
It could also be argued that this could also be applied to the WIC, given that they too 
are economists with no interest in social and environment public policy 
considerations. 
 
• The 2005 Act opened the non-domestic customer base to competition.  Scottish 
Water had to create another arm of its operations to compete in this ‘market’.  The 
new arm of Scottish Water will be called Scottish Water Retail Limited.  This 
body is to act entirely separately from Scottish Water and will in essence be a 
private firm working within a public corporation.  
 
• The WIC is in charge of judging who meets the criteria to compete in this market.  
They are in charge of distributing licences and determining charges. This once 
again places a great deal of responsibility and power in the hands of the economic 
regulator. 
 
• The Water Industry Commission is charged with monitoring economic efficiency 
and establishing competition in the provision of services to non-domestic 
customers under a licensing framework established under the Water Services 
(Scotland) Act 2005. 
 
• Proposals to introduce the private sector into domestic water supply in Scotland 
were rejected on the basis that new water retailers could ‘cherry-pick’ customers 
from wealthier areas rather than providing a uniform service to all.45  
 
It was feared it would 
 
Leave only low-banded households and those receiving discounts as 
customers of Scottish Water. Scottish Water’s revenues would be reduced, and 
it would have to increase its charges and might not be able to maintain 
discounts. This is contrary to the executive’s social objective for its water 
charging policy, which is to maintain these discounts and to keep the link 
between water charges and council tax banding, as this broadly affects ability 
to pay.46 
 
                                                 
44 STUC, Written evidence for Stage 1 of the Water Services etc. (Scotland) Bill - 15 September 2004    
45 Scottish Parliament Information Centre (SPICe) ‘Water Services Etc (Scotland) Bill Briefing Paper’,  
28th July 2004, 04/49, p14 
46  ibid 
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This continues to be a strong argument against the privatisation of Scottish Water.  
Yet if competition, proposed by many in the lobby for privatisation, was taken to its 
logical conclusion this is exactly what would happen.  
 
The Influence of EU legislation 
International legislation also has affected the governance structures of Scottish Water.  
It is widely accepted that the opening up to competition of the non-domestic sector of 
Scottish Water's business was intended to protect Scottish Water as a public utility.  
The rationale being that it would fend off those who might use the Competition Act to 
open up the domestic sector to competition; or, in other words privatise Scottish 
Water.  What was not mentioned at the time was the potential impact of other 
directives that originated from the EU: namely, the procurement and utility directives.   
 
The utility directive 2004/17/EC said that it was for 'co-ordinating the procurement 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal service 
sectors'.47 Moreover, it states that the directive is required so as to, 
 
Guarantee the opening up to competition of public procurement contracts 
awarded by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal 
services sectors.48    
 
It was adopted by the Scottish Parliament on January 31st 2006 under the name 'The 
Utilities Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2006'.  The UK government also had a 
statutory duty to implement the directive and whilst Scotland drafted its own 
legislation the principles of the bill directive essentially remain the same in Scotland 
as in the rest of the UK.  The Office of Government Commerce (OGC) said that the 
directive would,  
 
achieve significant savings through encouraging more efficient ways of 
working [and that they support] co-ordinating public sector procurement 
activities and managing several initiatives to open up government markets to 
competition and encourage private sector organisations to work better with the 
public sector49    
 
The Review of Public Procurement in Scotland - Report and Recommendations by 
John McClelland (also known as the McClelland programme) was said to be 'a far-
reaching and ambitious undertaking that aims to improve procurement across the 
Scottish Public Sector'50. Its vision is said to be 
 
The implementation of structures, capability and processes to provide 
continuous improvement in procurement across the Scottish Public Sector in 
order to deliver Value For Money improvements and support increased 
                                                 
47 Directive 2004/17/EC Of The European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 
48 Ibid, para 9 
49 OGC 'Introduction to Procurement'  
(http://www.ogc.gov.uk/introduction_to_procurement.asp) 
50 Scottish Executive, 'The Public Procurement Reform Programme, Implementing Improved 
Procurement in the Scottish Public Sector', General Briefing 6th October 2006 
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efficiency'.  And that, In order to achieve these efficiencies it required 
'Transparent, standardised procurement processes - helping businesses (their 
emphasis) to identify and bid for public sector opportunities.51 
 
These directives and the interpretation of then by the Scottish Executive has - and 
may well have future - further implications for the public sector and more specifically 
for Scottish Water.    
 
Regulation of water services in Scotland 
 
Therefore the current regulatory structure is a complex balancing act between 
advancing the interests of consumers, competitors and investors, while promoting a 
wider, ‘public interest’ agenda. Regulation needs to balance 
 
- minimum prices to benefit the consumer (maximise consumer surplus) 
- ensure adequate profits are earned to finance the proper investment needs of 
the industry  
- provide an environment conducive for new firms to enter the industry and 
expand competition 
- preserve quality of service 
- identify parts of the business which are truly naturally monopolistic  
- take into consideration social and environmental issues.52  
 
Regulators are responsible for overseeing industries vital to social and economic 
wellbeing (e.g. power and water). It is important that there is a proper system of 
democratic accountability, where there is a high degree of separation from political 
intervention but not complete independence from political scrutiny. A well-
functioning regulatory system is one that balances accountability, transparency and 
consistency.  The question of openness and transparency within the Scottish Water 
Industry is a concern.  Donald Dewar in 1999 was keen to ensure that all stakeholders 
were represented on the boards of the three water authorities.  This saw each water 
authority with between 12 and 14 members each.53  Today Scottish Water has eight 
board members.54  When Scottish Water was formed a broad representation of various 
stakeholders was seriously curtailed.   
 
The relative secrecy of the regulatory framework surrounding the Scottish Water 
Industry stands in marked contrast to regulation practiced elsewhere. Palast, (2003) 
offers a template of how regulation of utilities works in the USA.  He says amongst 
other things that ‘rights of transparency and participation, or ‘due processes’ must be 
observed’.  
 
                                                 
51 ibid 
52 Parker, D., 'Regulation of privatised public utilities in the UK: performance and governance', 
International Journal of Public Sector Management (1999) 
53 Scottish Parliament Information Centre, ‘The Water Industry’ Devolved Series/21 21 December 
1999  
54 Scottish Water, About US, Who We Are, The Board, 
http://www.scottishwater.co.uk/portal/page?_pageid=225,483530&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL 
Moreover, unlike the previous Water Authority Boards, Scottish Water’s board is almost exclusively 
made up of people from a business background. 
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This means no secrets, in the USA utility prices are set in a glass bowl.  
Anyone with an interest in utility prices can join the process.  This includes all 
customers -domestic and industrial alike – as well as those with a particular 
agenda, such as the protection of the environment, protection of poor people 
and the development of the economy.55  
 
Moreover: 
 
State or federal, elected or appointed, what all US utility regulators have in 
common is that their decisions, and all the facts on which they base them, are 
transparent to all and open to binding challenge by any.56   
 
The contrast of this system to the Scottish one was demonstrated by the case of 
Scottish Power which took over an electric utility in Oregon and Utah.  According to 
Palast, (2003);  
 
The purchase was delayed as the regulator held public hearings.  They also 
had to open all internal plans, information and records for public scrutiny. In 
fact, the US regulators required Scottish Power to sign a legal waiver allowing 
the US regulators to see documents of the company’s entire international and 
Scottish operations, which are not available to the public or government in 
Scotland itself.  Most extraordinary from the point of view of the execs from 
Scotland was that they were subject under oath to questioning by dozens of 
consumer advocates, among many others.57  
     
The legitimacy of the regulatory system depends upon public confidence and is 
associated with accountability, transparency and consistency. Accountability means 
that regulators, while having a large degree of operational independence, work within 
clearly agreed rules and are democratically accountable for their actions. Regulators 
should be required to justify their rules both to the industries and to the general public, 
which in the UK is through Parliament. Consistency requires a high level of 
uniformity and continuity in regulation. This reasoning is enshrined in company 
accounting legislation and should also be applied to public services, (see Appendix 4 
for a recommended summation of what the role of the regulator should be).  
 
The regulatory framework within the Scottish water industry that was borne from the 
2002 act, and enhanced in the 2005 act, is a replica of the English and Welsh 
regulatory framework, designed for their private industry. This was pointed out by 
Alan Sutherland in a written submission to the Environment and Rural Development 
Committee.  He extolled the virtues of the success of the water industry in England 
and Wales saying,  
 
A key common thread behind the companies success is the existence of a 
sound regulatory, financing and corporate governance structure for the 
industry. Its features include: ‘Independent regulation with powers of 
determination, subject to appropriate appeal; A clear and appropriate role for 
                                                 
55 Palast, G, et al, ‘Democracy and regulation How the Public can govern essential services’, (2003), 
p66 
56 ibid, p72 
57 ibid, p122 
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ministers to provide guidance to the regulators; Ring fencing of core water and 
sewerage activities (this ensured Wessex Water’s survival After the collapse 
of its parent Enron); Financial discipline and tight budget constraints; Audit by 
Reporters, independent of both company and regulator; Effective incentives on 
companies to deliver, through accountability to stakeholders and the 
publication of objective performance assessments by regulators.58  
 
He also said that many of these key success factors are now in place in Scotland.59 We 
have shown that all of these are common features of the Scottish Water Industry today 
and how the increasing marketisation of the industry would assist in a seamless 
transfer of ownership from the public to private sector should it be desired.    
 
The complexity of this regulatory framework, and the centrality the WIC before and 
after the 2005 Water Services (Scotland) Act, is illustrated in appendix 5. The roles of 
each regulator and the how the industry is structured is explained in appendix 2.  
 
The Water Industry Commission 
 
The WIC is made up of a Chief Executive, Alan Sutherland, a Chairman, Sir Ian Byatt 
and four other members.  Alan Sutherland is in charge of the day to day running of the 
WIC.  Prior to the Commission there was a Water Industry Commissioner, who was 
Alan Sutherland himself.  The remit of the WIC is to set budgets for Scottish Water to 
deliver the ministerial objectives.  According to the WIC, ‘We have a statutory duty to 
achieve best value for customers. We do this by setting prices for water and sewerage 
services that deliver Ministers’ objectives for the water industry at the lowest 
reasonable overall cost’.60  
 
The WIC’s view that private competition is more effective and delivers better results 
for customers is no secret. They said in their annual report for instance 'We have a 
role in facilitating competition in the Scottish Water industry. Competition will 
promote further efficiency gains and, where practicable, further choice for 
customers'.61 This belief in competition and the use of market principles in delivering 
water in Scotland is a thread running right throughout the Commission's annual 
report. Alan Sutherland states that 'Competition should bring lower prices and better 
services'.62 The report favourably reviews the water industry in England in contrast to 
Scotland and applauds the Scottish Executive for allowing incentives ‘to encourage 
good performance by Scottish Water…by linking managerial bonuses to (economic) 
outperformance of the regulatory contract’.63  
 
The members of the WIC are men with similar backgrounds (see Appendix 6). The 
Commission’s economists with an expert knowledge of the water industry is in line 
                                                 
58 Sutherland, A, Water Industry Commissioner,  Written evidence for Stage 1 of the Water Services 
etc. (Scotland) Bill, Environment and Rural Development Committee Report (2004) 
59  ibid. 
60 WIC Annual Report 2005/06 Page 3 
61 WIC Annual Report, 2005/06: 3. 
62 See Hall, D, Lobina, E, (2001) ‘UK Water privatisation a briefing’, Public Services International 
Research Unit (PSIRU), Greenwich , and Hall, D, Lobina, E, ‘The relative efficiency of public and 
private sector water’ Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU), Greenwich, (2005),  Both 
these pieces of Research by PRISU challenges this assertion 
63 WIC Annual Report, 2005/06: p11 
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with recommendations by the Better Regulation Taskforce, a government appointed 
body made up of members of the business community who declared that: ‘The boards 
of regulatory bodies should include both executive and non-executive members.  They 
should be appointed for their expertise rather than to represent stakeholder groups’.64   
 
The Executive, the Parliament and the Environment and Rural Affairs Committee in 
their scrutiny of the Water Services (Scotland) act (2005) supported this view when 
they voted for the change from a commissioner to a commission. There are concerns 
that the absence of stakeholders and the predominance of experts, namely economic 
experts with a neo-liberal ideological training, may well make the regulator 
unresponsive to the needs of customers. It is also worth asking if having a tight coterie 
of experts with a similar background simply entrenches homogeneity within the 
process and in effect is just the same as having only one commissioner. Further, there 
is genuine concern that the WIC may use their powerful position in the regulatory 
framework to shape an industry ripe for private takeover.  Whilst the WIC may say 
that it is independent of the Executive, their backgrounds suggest that they are 
instinctively sympathetic to a marketised water industry.  Further, it could be argued 
that since the chairman is appointed by the Executive the WIC is acting as a buffer for 
the Executive on politically controversial matters. 
 
One of the key planks of the arguments for private sector involvement in water in 
Scotland is to suggest that privatisation has been an almost unqualified success in 
England and Wales. Indeed the English and Welsh models are often cited by the WIC 
as models Scotland should strive to emulate. Alan Sutherland said in 2003. 
 
‘The industry in England and Wales has proved that it is possible to deliver 
better service, water quality and environmental compliance for customers, 
while also making significant improvements in its level of efficiency. There is 
no reason why Scottish Water should not be able to achieve a similar level of 
performance for customers here in Scotland and so justify the public sector 
model for the industry in Scotland’.65  
 
Alan Alexander, ex Chairman of Scottish Water, in his evidence to the Audit 
Committee of the Scottish Parliament early this year confirmed the marketised 
structure of Scottish Water.  
He said;  
‘It is extremely important to remember that the industry is a public sector 
industry, but we try to operate within the disciplines and constraints that have 
been successful in transforming the industry south of the border. Sir Ian knows 
more about that than anybody’.66   
 
The reasoning behind these assertions and comparisons, are deeply problematic.  As 
Jeanette Findlay (2004) stated, the comparators and methodology used by the WIC in 
                                                 
64 Better Regulation Taskforce 2001, ‘Economic regulators”   
http://www.brtf.gov.uk/taskforce/reports/BRTF%20Economic%20Regulation.pdf 
65 WIC, (2003) Costs and Performance Report 2002/03, p2/3 
(http://www.watercommissioner.co.uk/Documents/costsandperformance2003.pdf) 
66 Audit Committee: Overview of the Scottish Water Industry 
(http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/committees/audit/or-06/au06-0102.htm#Col405)  
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contrasting England and Wales to Scotland is ‘almost foolhardy’.67  She based her 
analysis on this on different factors like the debt write off when water in England and 
Wales was privatised; government grants totalled £6.6billion, increased investment as 
a consequence of them being able to borrow on the open market; England and Wales 
having over 20 years headstart in terms of investment and differences in topography, 
geography and population density.   
 
Quality and Standards 2006 – 2014: Strategic Business Plan and Final 
Determination 
 
Scottish Water has been charged with meeting objectives under the third capital and 
investment programme, Quality and Standards III.68 Under the process of determining 
charges relating to the capital investment programme, Scottish Water devised a 
Strategic Business Plan, with contains costs to fulfil objectives. During this period the 
WIC also develops a determination of charges, which goes out to consultation for 
stakeholders’ comments.  
 
Tensions emerged recently within this structure between the Scottish Executive, the 
WIC and Scottish Water over the proposed business plan for Scottish Water 2006-
2010. The WIC insisted that all the necessary investment in the water industry in 
Scotland could be accomplished for £2.15 billion. Scottish Water believed that it 
needed £3.3 billion to meet its objectives. This massive disparity calls into question 
the competence of the policy process, and why it was so. It also illustrated how the 
actions of the WIC could result in a situation that calls for further change to its 
governance structure. It also raises the question of whether the Final Determination of 
Charges, put forward by the WIC, and the one that is to go ahead, will provide enough 
resources to ensure that Scottish Water meets all its objectives.  Should Scottish 
Water not meet the Ministerial Objectives it may create a clamour for further changes 
to the ownership and governance structures of Scottish Water. 
 
There is doubt from various quarters that Scottish Water have been allocated enough 
resources to ensure the Ministerial Objectives are delivered. For instance, Alan Watt, 
Chief Executive of the Civil Engineering Contractors Association, expressed concerns 
about the budget set by the WIC. Watt claimed he was disappointed but not surprised 
by the Final Determination of charges and warned that it could hit jobs: 'Scottish 
Water will now be forced to review the size and scope of its works programme…the 
immediate upshot will almost certainly be a dearth of work on the ground over the 
next year, leading to downsizing across the water industry'69. From an environmental 
perspective there are serious concerns that thousands of homes are at risk of flooding 
with sewerage because the required upgrade of Scotland's ‘crumbling Victorian 
sewers’ is not being funded properly, an example being the forced postponement of 
148 projects to improve faulty sewerage pipes70. 
 
                                                 
67 Findlay, J, Financing the Scottish Water and Sewage Industry, Research Paper for the STUC, (2004), 
p12 
68 Scottish Executive, ‘Investing in Water Services: Objectives for 2006-2014 
(http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Environment/Water/17583/Investment)  
69 'Engineering chief fears for Water jobs' The Herald, December 5th 2005, 
70 Edwards, R. 'Sewer repairs hit by funding crisis' The Sunday Herald, January 29 2006.  
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Homes for Scotland also claim that '8000 projects are being delayed or abandoned 
because Scottish Water has failed to connect water and sewerage.'71 Allan Lundmark, 
director of planning at Homes for Scotland, warned that 'Development constraints are 
already kicking in and it will not be possible to maintain current rates of 
housebuilding without more investment'. Sir Ian Byatt, Chairman of the WIC, rejected 
this charge saying that the budget set for Scottish Water 'is quite enough for needs, 
That does not mean there will never be development restrictions…But, as a general 
rule there is plenty of money to service water and sewerage for new houses in 
Scotland'.72  
 
Moreover, from a letter uncovered through FOI we found evidence of concerns from 
insiders that there is not enough money to meet the objectives.   Scottish Water stated, 
‘improvements will be achieved through a combination of capital investment, capital 
maintenance and operational practices.  There is insufficient capital funding to 
achieve the required investment through capital investment alone’.73  This is a detail 
that has not been openly declared by anyone in the process. Moreover, there are other 
stakeholders and interested parties who have concerns that the draft determination of 
charges as set by the WIC may prove not to be enough. 
 
Alf Young, Herald columnist, commented 'there is deep unease that the targets being 
set by the Scottish executive and its regulators for Scottish Water’s next phase of 
development, from 2006 to 2010, are neither realistic nor deliverable under the 
charging regime that they propose'.74 The STUC concur, noting that the requirement 
for Scottish Water to 'deliver a massive investment programme, over a short time-
scale, with no real charge increase is like a ‘magic circle’ that could not be 
achieved… (due to) short term political demands to keep water charges down 
triumphing over the need to rebuild Scotland’s ageing water and sewerage 
infrastructure'.75 The charging debate has allowed the WIC to be portrayed as being 
on the side of the customers,76 reigning in the irresponsible spending plans of Scottish 
Water. Therefore if Scottish Water is unable to fulfil the ministerial objectives set for 
2006-10 it is likely that there will be more calls for private sector solutions to 
perceived public sector 'inefficiency'. 
  
It is true that the Scottish Executive has been under increasing political pressure since 
2003 to keep bills down, for both domestic and small business customers.  It is also 
clear that Scottish Water has therefore been constrained in its budgetary options. 
Given the concerns raised over the very tight budget set by the WIC over making 
badly needed improvements to infrastructure, in which to redress Scottish Water 's 
unenviable tag as the ‘leakiest’ water company in the UK77, it may well be that the 
                                                 
71 'Builders blame Scottish Water for delays in New homes 'The Herald’, February 22 2006 
72 “Inadequate Water supplies are threatening the flow of new homes in Scotland” The Sunday Times 
December 18th, 2005, 
73 Letter from Geoff Aitkenhead, Asset Management Director at Scottish Water, to Colin Maclaren, 
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74 Young, A., “Get more pay less target may not be achievable”, The Sunday Herald, October 16 2005 
75 STUC Water Campaign Research Brief 
76 ‘Water cash leak plugged at last’, The Daily Record, 1 December 2005, Comment, p8 
77 ‘Scottish Water, Leakiest in the UK as 1 billion litres lost every year’. The Evening News, June 17th 
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Scottish Executive could and should prioritise funding for water much more.  This 
would ensure that all objectives were met whilst still keeping as low as possible, the 
politically contentious question of, prices.   
 
The dispute also highlighted the power of the WIC and their foremost preoccupation 
with cost, and the propensity of the Executive to back the WIC ahead of Scottish 
Water. This was illustrated by correspondence between the WIC, Scottish Water and 
the Minister uncovered through  FOI documentation.  Ross Finnie, when asking the 
regulators to examine the rebuttal by Scottish Water of the regulators concerns over 
their business plan, said ‘Ministers place great store in the views of the regulators’.78  
The WIC wrote to Ministers saying that they still believed that Scottish Water is 
‘retreating from taking responsibility on development constraints and maintaining 
asset serviceability…and of a delayed investment scenario extending beyond 2010’.79 
Conversely, Scottish Water hinted at confusion over what plan, the draft or final one, 
was actually being considered.  As Alan Alexander said ‘I was surprised by many of 
the comments made by the WIC and SEPA as they did not appear to the delivery plan 
that I submitted to you (Ross Finnie) on 1 February’.80  Moreover, he responds to the 
WIC statement that the Scottish Water delivery plan ‘falls short’ by saying ‘none of 
the commission’s listed issues relates to the targets specified in the ministerial 
directions; rather they all relate to additional targets set by the commission beyond 
those specified in the directions81. This seems to be saying that the WIC is adding 
further work for Scottish Water to do, but within the existing budget. Alan Alexander 
however, did state that they addressed ‘every concern raised by the regulators’82 The 
WIC disagreed stating that the ‘WIC sees no reason to change its view that the 
delivery plan falls short of the requirements of the Final Determination in a number of 
material aspects’.83 Given that Alan Alexander resigned on February 20, 2006 over 
what Ross Finnie said was a ‘fundamental disagreement’84 it is difficult not to 
conclude that the Scottish Executive sided with the WIC. 
 
However Alan Alexander’s successor, Ronnie Mercer, claimed subsequently that:  
 
Scottish Water is delivering a far better deal for customers. These massive 
efficiency savings and significant service improvements are good news for 
customers and good news for Scotland…Four years ago, when Scottish Water 
was created, the industry was way behind the private companies in England 
and Wales. We’ve now closed that gap on many measures… The results 
delivered by Scottish Water’s employees give me great confidence that we 
                                                 
78 Scottish Executive Document uncovered by Freedom of Information, Letter from Ross Finnie to Sir 
Ian Byatt, 14th February 2006. 
79 WIC Document uncovered by Freedom of Information, Letter from Sir Ian Byatt to Deputy Minister 
Rhona Brankin 7th February 2006a 
80 Scottish Water Document uncovered by Freedom of Information, Letter from Alan Alexander to 
Ross Finnie 10th February 2006 
81 ibid 
82 ibid 
83 WIC Document uncovered by Freedom Of Information, Letter from Sir Ian Byatt to Ross Finnie 13 
February 2006 
84 Lessware, J, ‘Did these letters open the floodgates for the Chairman?’, The Scotsman, 24 February 
2006, p47 
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will continue to deliver further vital improvements for our customers over the 
next four years.85 
 
He does not categorically state, however, that the Ministerial Objectives for the next 
four years will definitely be achieved.  Neither does the WIC who say merely that 
they ‘should’ be achieved.86       
                                                 
85 ‘Scottish Water Beats Efficiency Targets’, Scottish Water.co.uk  
http://www.scottishwater.co.uk/portal/page?_pageid=219,4804148&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL) 
86 WIC Annual Report 2005/2006, p12  
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The Drift to Privatisation: Restructuring of the Industry  
 
Thus far we have set out a case that the system is moving towards increasing 
involvement of the private sector in Scottish Water, most notably through Scottish 
Water Solutions and the consequent familiarising by the private sector of the vagaries 
and complexities of the Scottish Water Industry. 
 
One of the key means by which the private sector has assumed a greater role in the 
water industry in Scotland has been through commercial relationships with Scottish 
Water. Scottish Water was allowed to enter into contractual arrangements with 
external partners, in practice private providers, by the Water Industry (Scotland) Act, 
2002. The act states 'Scottish Water may engage in any activity (whether in Scotland 
or elsewhere) which it considers is not inconsistent with the economic, efficient and 
effective exercise of its core functions'.87 Scottish Water may do anything which it 
considers necessary or expedient for the purpose of or in connection with its 
functions'.88  
 
The power in subsection 2 includes in particular the power to…form or 
promote (whether alone or with others) companies within the companies act 
1985…To form partnerships, enter into arrangements or agreements and co-
operate in any way with any person…[and to]…enter into a contract with any 
person for the provision or making available of assets or services, or both 
(whether or not together with goods) whether by Scottish Water or by that 
person.89  
 
According to SWS their main aim is to deliver ‘better value for money and a superior 
service’ for Scottish Water’s five million customers as well as environmental 
improvements to Scotland’s rivers and coastlines. SWS is a limited company within a 
publicly owned organisation. Its enthusiasts argue that SWS brings global best 
practices from each partner to the Scottish Water industry, particularly in the fields of 
asset management, engineering, programme management and construction.’ 
 
SWS is in effect a joint venture partnership, bringing together eight different 
corporate partners (see Appendix 3). Scottish Water is the majority owner with a 51% 
shareholding in SWS. The balance is shared equally by two consortia: UUGM 
Limited led by United Utilities with their construction partners GallifordTry and 
Morgan Est and Stirling Water Limited led by Thames Water with their construction 
partners Gleeson, KBR and Alfred McAlpine. As part of the second Quality and 
Standards programme Scottish Water Solutions will deliver around 2,300 projects 
with an estimated value of £1bn.90  The increasing involvement of the private sector 
in the water sector is understandable given the volume and value of business 
available. The entry of the private sector has been accompanied by a campaign to 
convince policy makers to move more decisively towards privatisation. 
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Part 2 Scottish Water and the Private sector: Where we are going 
 
The Campaign to privatise Scottish Water 
 
The promotion of alternatives to the public service model under which Scottish Water 
currently operates, especially mutualisation and privatisation, has been a feature of 
recent debate about the water sector in Scotland.  The current discourse and debate 
pertaining to water services in Scotland is being dominated and framed by those who 
advocate either privatisation or mutualisation. For instance, The Scotsman newspaper 
and the market fundamentalist think tank, the Policy Institute have both taken a pro 
privatisation stance. The Scotsman  has regularly reported ‘bad’ news stories about 
Scottish Water, largely in the context of the necessity for privatisations.91. Professor 
Colin Robinson published a paper, through the policy institute, advocating the 
privatisation of Scottish Water92 as did Donald McKay (another board member of the 
PI) in a recent co-authored report.93 Another influential think tank on the Scottish 
scene, the Fraser of Allander also recommended a switch from the public sector 
model. In a widely reported intervention the economist, Jo Armstrong94, had a paper 
co-published by the Fraser Allander Institute and Scottish Council Foundation, which 
argued that Scottish Water was a drain on Scottish Executive resources and leached 
funds that could better be directed to what were termed 'essential services', This does 
beg the question as to what could be more essential than clean water?  That said, it has 
been said by Jim Cuthbert amongst others that this argument is ‘nonsense’ and that 
even if the block grant was cut Scottish Water would still be able to continue giving 
enough loans in order to meet their current investment plans.95 
   
Other strands of Scottish life supportive of the privatisation of Scottish Water have 
included the CBI,96, and other newspapers like the Daily Mail 97and the Sunday 
Times98  A leading Scottish Corporate Financier, Frank Malcolm, unsurprisingly 
enough, also called for the privatisation of Scottish Water in 2006 as did John 
Blundell of the Institute of Economic Affairs.99  It is clear that the business lobby is 
circling around the guaranteed profits of the Scottish water industry. Perhaps the most 
concerning person and organisation advocating changes to the governance structures 
of Scottish Water is Sir Ian Byatt and the WIC. Byatt said he believes that Scottish 
Water should be turned into a mutual model, thus freeing it from state ownership.  
Moreover, he and Alan Sutherland have put in place a detailed blueprint for doing 
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so.100  This intervention by Sir Ian Byatt was arguably way out of his remit, 
nonetheless it sparked much debate amongst leading Politicians in Scotland regarding 
the future governance of water in Scotland.  See below for a discussion on this debate.   
 
The public agenda has tended to be dominated by those pressing for change to the 
governance structures of Scottish Water, due to either its perceived ineffectiveness 
or/and its inability to address developmental constraints. The framing of the debate in 
this way places water as a purely economic resource, rather than as a social resource, 
public good, or even a natural resource that needs to be sustained for future 
generations.  In addition, there is little mention of successful community run and 
publicly owned models for the management of water resources. Throughout this 
debate there is little mention of the decrease in manpower within Scottish Water itself 
and the simultaneous increased involvement of the private sector in the provision of 
water services in Scotland today. The tenor of public debate about water in Scotland 
stands in marked contrast to experiences elsewhere: much of the evidence from other 
countries points to the failure of private models of water ownership and delivery. One 
is left to conclude that much of the public debate in Scotland relating to Scottish 
Water is based more on ideology and dogmatism than comparative evidence.  
 
In parallel to this public discourse there has been considerable behind the scenes 
lobbying on behalf of two of the main stakeholders, Scottish Water and the WIC. It is 
as yet unclear what the precise purpose of this activity might be as details of the 
relationships between Scottish Water, the WIC and their retained commercial 
lobbying firms might be. It is however legitimate to question if this is a worthy use of 
public money.101   
 
Political Context  
Aside from the Conservatives no political party has openly declared itself in favour of 
the full privatisation of Scotland’s water industry. In fact the major parties said little 
in relation to water in their manifestos for the last Scottish election in 2003. Yet the 
two coalition parties in the Scottish Executive, Labour and the Liberal Democrats, 
introduced the Water Services (Scotland) Act in 2004 without signalling their 
intention to do so during the election. When one considers that this legislation 
effectively transferred power over the budgetary process to the WIC it is perhaps 
surprising that this was not put to the electorate during the previous years Scottish 
Election. Despite the volume of recent water legislation in Scotland the pressure for 
more changes to the governance structures of Scottish Water continues. Whether this 
will be legitimated by an electoral test or referendum remains to be seen. If the water 
industry in Scotland is privatised 'by the back door', or moved away from the public 
sector through some form of mutualisation, then serious questions about the nature of 
devolved decision making and the sharing of power between the people and 
Parliament must be raised. 
                                                 
100 ‘Free Scottish Water from state to avoid surge in bills, ministers told’, The Scotsman, 8th June 2006 , 
p,5 
101 The WIC employs the lobbyists Greenhaus Communications.  There is no mention of this 
relationship either in the main body of their annual report or in their financial accounts.  However 
through Freedom of Information we have discovered that the WIC paid Greenhaus £27,500 over a 9 
month period from when their contract began in March 2005. ‘WIC Document uncovered by FO, e-
mail between Chris Winslow (Greenhaus) and Katherine Russell, (Corporate Affairs at the WIC) 
March 7th, 2006.  Scottish Water employs the lobby firm Fleishman Hillard 
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Ross Finnie Minister for the Environment and Rural Development refused to discount 
the possibility of mutualisation in the future, arguing that it would be a 'foolish 
politician who ruled out change'102. This was despite his assurances during the 
Holyrood debate in 2004 over the Water Services bill that the Executive 'would 
defend public sector water provision in Scotland'103. Finnie has recently insisted that 
'there are no plans to privatise Scottish Water '104. However, many people involved in 
the water sector divine an increasing role for the private sector in Scotland's water, 
through the ongoing use of PPPs and joint ventures with private industry in delivering 
water infrastructure and the persistent floating of mutualisation as a new model for 
Scottish Water. 
 
As mentioned above, the Chairman of the WIC, Sir Ian Byatt, sparked some debate in 
the Labour Party by advocating a new ownership and control model for Scottish 
Water. This prompted First Minister Jack McConnell to claim 'There are no current 
plans to change our position' though he failed to rule out proposals from MSPs linked 
to the Co-op movement which recommended a mutual model should be considered. 
There has been some confusion over the exact model of mutualisation being 
proposed.  
 
McConnell said: 'I am sure there will be a debate within the Labour Party over the 
next 12 months as we consider our manifesto for the next Scottish election, and views 
on both sides will be expressed.'105 While clearly not embracing the WIC's model of 
mutualisation, the First Minister expressly did not discount it.  There has also been 
speculation that the UK Treasury is considering selling off Scottish Water. 106  If this 
was proved to be the case then this would provoke questions relating to the devolution 
settlement itself, given that water in Scotland and its governance is a devolved matter.  
  
                                                 
102 MacMahon, P, , ‘Finnie refuses to rule out Scottish Water Mutual plan’ The Scotsman, June 9th 2006 
103 ‘Water legislation under twin attack for protecting monopoly and opening up market’ The Scotsman, 
November 18th 2004,  
104, ‘Executive is not about to Privatise Scottish Water insists Finnie’ The Scotsman, March 23rd 2006 
105 ‘Water ownership debate begins; First minister faces call give industry mutual status’ The Herald, 
9th June 2006, 
106 ‘Row Brews over £2billion plan to float Scottish Water’, Daily Telegraph, March 20th 2006,  p,1  
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The English Experience and the RCV method 
 
We have argued that the Scottish Water regulatory framework is akin to the English 
model.  In this section, we will consider some of the accounting techniques used by 
the English economic regulator, OFWAT to deal with the problems thrown up by 
regulating private monopolies.   
 
When publicly owned monopolies are privatised there is the real danger that the 
private owners will charge monopolistic (very high) prices.  The majority of formerly 
state owned monopolies provided essential goods and services (gas, electricity, water 
and so on) to corporations as well as to individuals.  The fear of monopolistic pricing 
lay behind the government’s introduction of regulators of privatised monopolies.  
Regulators (like OFWAT) are typically charged with the responsibility of ensuring 
that privatised monopolies make a “fair” return but not monopoly profits. OFWAT 
itself has publicly stated that one of its duties is 'to secure that companies are able (in 
particular by securing reasonable returns on their capital) to finance the proper 
carrying out of the functions of such undertakers.'107 108  
 
Economic regulators are therefore faced with a complex task.   They have typically 
addressed this by taking guidance from a neoclassical economic framework which 
states that assets (for example, pipes, water treatment plants, pumping stations and so 
on) should provide an economic rent (or financial return) to investors.   Put simply, if 
the assets of a newly privatised water company are valued at (say) £100 million and a 
fair rate of return (or economic rent) is (say) 10%, then the company should be able to 
charge prices at a level which would ensure that the profits are £10 million.  This 
simple example belies the complexity which regulators face in valuing the assets of a 
company.  It is beyond the scope of this report to explore this issue. However, 
addressing a few key questions highlights some of the technical issues.  Should one 
value be placed upon the whole water network?  Should each individual unit (eg 
pumping station, treatment plant etc) be valued separately and then added together? 
Should the assets be valued at the amount they initially cost (historic cost), the 
amount they are worth today (market value), the amount it would cost to replace them 
(replacement cost) or some other cost?   Research has shown that the particular 
valuation method used by OFWAT ensures that privatised water companies make vast 
rates of return109. 
                                                 
107 OFWAT, ‘Financial Performance and Expenditure of the Water Companies in England and Wales’ 
2005 
108 In effect this means that water companies can legally justify price increases as necessary to offset 
the costs of upgrading infrastructure. On the face of it this might seem reasonable. However, 'market' 
values tell us nothing about the overall social worth of investments. In other words, a simple monetary 
amount tells us nothing about the investment choices being made. Does the investment help to protect 
existing supplies? Does the investment improve pollution control? Does the investment simply move 
the water shortage problem to another area? Evidence from England and Wales suggests that in the 
decade following privatisation companies did not reinvest in the infrastructure claiming that 
profitability would be compromised. Consumers saw their rates increase by 102% (46% in real terms).  
OFWAT Memorandum, 18 March, 1998 from the House of Commons Research paper 98/117 
December 1998. cited in Lobina, E., “UK Water Privatization: a Briefing” Public Services 
International, University of Greenwich, February 2001, p 7)  
109 Cuthbert, J.R, ‘How the RCV Method Implies Excessive Returns on Capital Expenditure’. Response 
to OFWAT/OFGEM discussion document on ‘Financing Networks’, published on OFGEM website: 
(August 2006). 
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OFWAT uses a fairly complex formula (see below) to calculate the value of each 
privatised water company.  The result of this formula is called Regulatory Capital 
Value (RCV).110   RCV is the starting point to work out the return (or profit) for each 
water company. It should be pointed out at this stage that there can be few examples 
of other private companies throughout the world which have a regulator to ensure 
that they receive a set rate of return on their investment. This is essentially a form of 
corporate welfare.    
 
Clearly the regulation of privatised monopolies is difficult (not least because of the 
technicalities of valuing them in the first place).  But, how successful has regulation 
been in England?111  Research suggests that regulation and legislation have failed to 
address concerns about the behaviour of the privatised water companies, particularly 
the pursuit of profit at the expense of customers, aggressive pricing, lack of 
reinvestment and higher dividends awarded to shareholders and owners.112 Profit 
margins in the privatised UK water industry far exceed those of the rest of the 
world.113  The activities of the water companies in England and Wales, and their 
regulatory system, have been criticised for their lack of transparency.114 Many argue 
that British privatised water companies have lost sight of the notion that water is more 
than a commodity -- it is a basic human right to have access to clean water.  
 
Regulatory Capital Value (RCV) 
Accounting information or to be more specific, regulatory accounting is one of the 
keys to understanding two central (and controversial) features of the water industry. 
These are  
 
1 Water pricing, and 
2 Investment in infrastructure. 
 
Of course these two are closely connected. OFWAT ensure that if a company invests 
money in new infrastructure it is allowed to increase prices in order to earn a return on 
the new infrastructure. Underpinning the accounting numbers used in regulatory 
accounts are some questionable assumptions. These are 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Cuthbert, J.R., Cuthbert, M.: ‘Water: The Birth of a Cash Cow. Why water privatisation in Scotland is 
inevitable unless we rethink the basis of utility pricing’. 
Talk given at conference on "Neo-liberal Scotland: Rethinking Scotland in a Global Context", at the 
University of Strathclyde, 20th May 2006. 
110 When companies were first privatized, RCV was based upon the share prices plus the companies 
borrowings, thus it took at market value approach.   
111 eg the 1983 and 1989 Water Acts, the Water Industry Act 1991 which brought together sewerage 
legislation, the Competition and Services (Utilities) Act 1992, which applied to the regulatory bodies 
dealing with privatized utilities, such as OFWAT; the Environment Act 1995 placed a duty on the 
companies to promote the efficient use of water by customers. 
112  Lobina, E., and Hall, D.  ‘Public Sector Alternatives to Water Supply and Sewerage Privatisation: 
Case Studies’, PSIRU Report, 1999, p,11, Lobina and Hall; UK Water Privatisation – A briefing, 2001 
113 Lobina, E., and Hall, D. ‘Public Sector Alternatives to Water Supply and Sewerage Privatisation: 
Case Studies’, PSIRU Report, 1999,  p,11 
114 The meetings of companies and regulators are not public and this has meant that decision-making 
lost some of its perceived transparency. See Lobina and Hall; UK Water Privatisation – A briefing, 
2001, OFWAT, 2005. 
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1 that the most 'correct' value is the market value. Thus the values used in 
water accounts are not 'social values' or 'environmental values'. For 
example, they do not begin to address questions such as 'what is the value 
of having a sustainable water system in Scotland in the 21st century?' 
2 That efficiency means market economic efficiency. This is very different 
to what customers and the public might understand as efficient. A reduced 
workforce is seen as economically efficient, even though there is ample 
anecdotal evidence that response times to leaks and service problems are 
increasing, so customers experience Scottish Water as increasingly 
inefficient.  Whilst Scottish Water has won customer service awards and is 
improving in the sphere of Overall Performance Assessment (OPA)115 
there are also numerous current examples of how Scottish Water is 
stretched to the limit and not fulfilling standard customer obligations 
throughout Scotland. This suggests that the draft determination of charges, 
given how tight the budgets are, might not be enough to meet all the social 
and environmental obligations that the Scottish Executive set, but also that 
which their customers expect.  For instance, there have been examples of 
hundreds of houses not being built in the Highlands, which Highland 
Council believes may be as a result of urban areas taking priority over 
rural areas116.  There have been recent examples of Sewage discharges in 
Dingwall117 and Nairn118, resulting in fines for Scottish Water.  There were 
sewage leaks and odors in places as far apart as Glasgow119, 
Burntisland120, Gourock121, Pathhead in Fife122, South Queensferry123, 
Eyemouth124 and Cellardyke in Fife125.  Moreover, many of these have 
taken a long time to be repaired or sorted, despite the associated health 
risk.  There are also recent examples of water quality being less than 
customers expect in Lerwick126, Inverclyde127 and in Scotland generally as 
the DWQR reported water quality down on the previous year128.   
                                                 
115 WIC Annual Report 2005/2006, p,24 
116 ‘Homes 'held up' by water supplies’, BBC News, Friday, 18 August 2006,     
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/highlands_and_islands/5262398.stm)  
117, ‘Agency in hot water after pollution probe’, Highland News, 24th August 2006  
(http://www.highland-
news.co.uk/news/fullstory.php/aid/403/Agency_in_hot_water_after_pollution_probe.html)  
118 ‘Games linked to sewage incident’, BBC News, 17th August 2006, 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/highlands_and_islands/5260376.stm)  
119 ‘Sewage spill nightmare for mother’,  BBC News, 18th August 2006, 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/glasgow_and_west/5262556.stm)  
120 ‘We're sick of raw sewage pouring down flooded street’, Fife today , 24th August 2006, 
(http://www.fifenow.co.uk/ViewArticle2.aspx?SectionID=1015&ArticleID=1717395)  
121 ‘Scottish Water Forced to Clean Up its Act’, Greenock Telegraph, 3rd August 2006, 
(http://www.greenocktelegraph.co.uk/readstory.php?id=7492) 
122 ‘What do we have to do to get rid of this pong?’, Fife today 3rd August 2006  
(http://www.fifenow.co.uk/ViewArticle2.aspx?SectionID=1015&ArticleID=1670496) 
123 ‘Sewage saga causing a stink’, The Scotsman, 29th August 2006 
(http://news.scotsman.com/edinburgh.cfm?id=1274642006)  
124 ‘Smell frustrates Eyemouth residents’, Berwickshire today, 3rd August 2006,  
(http://www.berwickshiretoday.co.uk/ViewArticle2.aspx?SectionID=972&ArticleID=1667531)  
125, ‘Water chiefs told: your service stinks!’, Fife Today, 30th August 2006 
(http://www.fifenow.co.uk/ViewArticle2.aspx?SectionID=1015&ArticleID=1727631)  
126 ‘Water filthy Mess’!, Shetland Today 11/08/06 
(http://www.shetlandtoday.co.uk/Shetlandtimes/content_details.asp?ContentID=19884) 
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Economic efficiency is concerned with lowering costs so that a company can increase 
its profits. Recent studies have shown that many employed in the water industry have 
taken redundancies or have lost their jobs through the pursuit of increased 
efficiency.129 The efficiency measures in regulatory accounts cannot be understood as 
measures of social efficiency. 
 
In England and Wales, the RCV starts with a direct measure of value placed on each 
company’s capital and debt by the financial markets following privatisation.130 The 
RCV is a value placed on a company’s asset base, on which it should earn a return. It 
is adjusted for additions and depreciation. Additions affect the price cap by increasing 
the RCV. As the rate of return remains constant (it is a percentage of the RCV) any 
increase in the RCV increases the amount of return allowed in the revenue 
requirement and increases prices. 
 
The infrastructure renewals charge (IRC) is an explicit component of the company’s 
revenue requirement. The regulator ensures that customers do not pay for the same 
investment again through the RCV. The IRC is therefore subtracted from the RCV. 
 
Example given by the Scottish Regulator131 
 
In this example, it is important to understand that prices are set to ensure that 
water companies receive a rate of return for their previous investment and for 
any investment which they plan to make in the coming period. Suppose that 
the regulator has allowed £10m in the revenue requirement for infrastructure 
expenditure. If the company actually spends £12m there may be a case for 
allowing the company to recover a further £2m. The regulator can do this by 
adding £2m to the RCV. The company will then recover £12m, £10m through 
the IRC and £2m through the RCV. Suppose that the regulator has allowed 
£10m but the company has actually spent only £8m. The regulator must claw 
back £2m to ensure that customers are not paying for investment that has not 
been made. The regulator can do this by deducting £2m from the RCV. 
 
The RCV is computed as follows 
 
Closing RCV (previous year) 
                                                                                                                                            
127 ‘Water Chiefs told to keep it clean’, Greenock Telegraph, 11th August 2006, 
(http://www.greenocktelegraph.co.uk/readstory.php?id=7523)  
128 Levels of bacterial pollution in Scotland's drinking water have risen over the past year, according to 
Scottish water watchdog's annual report. 
(http://www.edie.net/news/news_story.asp?id=11854&channel=0) 
129 Lobina, E., and Hall, D. ‘Public Sector Alternatives to Water Supply and Sewerage Privatisation: 
Case Studies’, PSIRU Report, 1999. 
130 The initial RCV was calculated as the average of the market value of each company for the first 200 
days for which the shares were listed plus the total debt at privatisation. It is adjusted by the increase in 
the Retail Price Index. In Scotland the Modern Equivalent Asset (MEA) value is used. MEA is a 
measure of the cost to replace an old asset with a technically up-to-date new asset with the same 
service capability, allowing for any difference both in the quality of output and in operating costs. 
131(http://www.watercommissioner.co.uk/Documents/src2006/volume3/VOL3_COMPLETE.pdf#searc
h=%22example%20scottish%20sutherland%20rcv%20infrastructure%20expenditure.%20%22 
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+ 
Indexation 
+ 
Capital expenditure (excluding IRE) 
+ 
Infrastructure renewal expenditure (IRE) 
- 
Infrastructure renewals charges (IRC) 
- 
Grants and contributions 
- 
Depreciation 
- 
Disposals 
= 
Closing RCV 
 
Cuthbert and Cuthbert’s research has highlighted many significant problems with the 
RCV model as it is used by OFWAT.  Two problems will be highlighted here.  
 
1 the RCV model’s treatment of money spent by water companies repairing 
pipes to stop leaks creates a disincentive for companies to repair pipes, and  
 
2 the RCV model’s use of current value accounting means that when prices are 
rising, water companies will make excess profits. 
 
Accounting typically distinguishes between two types of expenditure – “operating 
expenditure” and “capital expenditure”.  Operating Expenditure could be described as 
everyday running expenses, whereas Capital Expenditure is money spent on new 
assets.  So for example, the purchase of a new car is capital expenditure but money 
spent on fuel is operating expenditure.  According to the RCV model, money spent on 
fixing pipes to stop leaks (infrastructure renewal) counts as “operating expenditure”.  
Operating expenditure is not added to the RCV and so doesn’t attract a rate of return 
through the model. 
 
The RCV model used by OFWAT is indexed such that it contains “current” rather 
than “historic” values.   So if a water company invests in an asset which costs £10 and 
the inflation index is 3%, at the end of the year, the assets RCV will be £10.30.  The 
company will be able to make a return on the £10.30, even though the cost of the asset 
was only £10.  Cuthbert and Cuthbert have demonstrated that if inflation (or the 
indexing) is as low as 2.5% pa and the rate of interest is 5%, that companies will 
make almost 50% additional profit over a 30 year period simply because of the 
accounting techniques used by OFWAT.132 
                                                 
132 Cuthbert, J.R, ‘How the RCV Method Implies Excessive Returns on Capital Expenditure’. Response 
to OFWAT/OFGEM discussion document on ‘Financing Networks’, published on OFGEM website: 
(August 2006). 
Cuthbert, J.R., Cuthbert, M.: ‘Water: The Birth of a Cash Cow. Why water privatisation in Scotland is 
inevitable unless we rethink the basis of utility pricing’. 
Talk given at conference on "Neo-liberal Scotland: Rethinking Scotland in a Global Context", at the 
University of Strathclyde, 20th May 2006. 
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So far we have simply stated that the water companies are allowed by the regulator 
through the pricing mechanism to earn a 'rate of return'. Who determines what this 
rate should be? Traditional finance theory suggests that there is a risk/return tradeoff. 
This means that companies which invest in 'risky' investments can expect greater 
returns than for investing in safe ones. Yet, the state sanctioned guarantee of a certain 
margin of profitability on all investments minimises the risk to the private water 
companies. Yet the returns of water companies are relatively high. Indeed the social 
risk of the failure to have a cheap plentiful supply of water is borne by the state. If 
there is (for example) an E. coli contamination of drinking water, the subsequent 
health care and other costs would be borne by the state and not the private water 
company concerned. 
 
In summary, it could be argued that regulation is a 'good thing', because the regulator 
ensures that water companies do not hike their prices to unreasonable levels (which as 
monopoly suppliers of an essential service they could easily do). However, what the 
regulator does in effect is to ensure that the Regulatory Capital Value (a proxy for the 
market value of the company) is used to ensure that a 'fair' return is given to the 
investors in water companies. While the regulatory model could be said to 'encourage' 
much needed investment in the water industry, in practice, it contains serious flaws.  
These flaws mean that expenditure on repairs is disincentivised while companies 
which invest in capital projects (new fixed assets) can earn excess profits.  Moreover, 
there is no transparency or public debate about what should be invested in from a 
broader social perspective. This is an accountability issue. The hidden costs of 
privatisation are simply not captured by regulatory accounts.  Some of the “hidden” 
costs of privatisation are discussed next. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 32
Policy Options: The Hidden Costs of Privatisation 
 
It is clear that in England and Wales, and in Scotland, regulatory accounts cannot 
capture the social costs and social values of a water system. In the context of 
increasing private sector participation in the water industry there are many unseen or 
hidden costs of privatisation which should be considered. 
 
1 Accountability 
 
Water companies are legally accountable to their shareholders and not to the 
general public. This means that the general public have no say in where or 
what water companies invest in or whether private companies should invest at 
all. Under privatisation investment decisions are 'private decisions' which 
pertain to capital by virtue of its property rights. However much the welfare of 
the majority will be affected by them. The nature of our economic system and 
its relentless drive to profits means that we cannot be provided with 
information by the regulatory or by the individual private company accounts 
with which to make socially effective and efficient decisions. Any analysis of 
public effects of economic action requires information that individual 
companies do not provide. Because they produce unregulated and unplanned 
social effects, capitalist markets create enormous social inefficiencies.133  
 
Arguably, some accountability issues could be dealt with by setting up 
regulatory bodies to oversee the activities of private companies. However, this 
can remove another important layer of accountability – the accountability of 
elected representatives. Again, developments in Scotland suggest this is a real 
concern with the drift in water policy since devolution. Recent changes to the 
regulatory powers in Scotland under which executive statutory powers to 
determine charges were handed over to the WIC. This significant change takes 
accountability for charging away from elected representatives and ministers.  
 
2 Private Financing (or loans) cost more than Government Financing 
 
There is a perception that although Victorian water systems are in desperate 
need of replacement that the government is unable to borrow the large sums of 
money to replace them. The solution is to shift the burden from the public to 
the private sector. However, since governments are very low risk when it 
comes to borrowing, banks will loan money to governments at lower rates of 
interest than to companies. This means that if the task of replacing outdated 
water systems is transferred to the private sector then it is likely that banks 
will receive additional interest. Of course in the long run, this increased 
expense is met by water consumers.  
 
If additional costs of dividends and executive salaries are added to the higher 
rates of interest, it is difficult to see how water consumers will benefit from 
this. A report published by the Public Service International Research Unit 
(PSIRU) comparing the Swedish publicly owned water system with the 
                                                 
133 See for example. Hahnel, R., and M Albert, Quiet Revolution in Welfare Economics, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990, p 218 
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privatised system in England and Wales found that the Swedish system had 
lower operating and maintenance costs, and that customers paid less for their 
water. In England and Wales, both the operating costs and customer rates were 
more than double those in Sweden.134 
 
3 Privatisation leads to job losses 
 
In England and Wales, the number of employees in water and wastewater was 
reduced by almost 10,000 over a 10 year period.135 There will be a social as 
well as a financial cost to this. It is unlikely that all 10,000 people found 
another job straight away. It is likely therefore that they would be paid social 
security benefits. There would also be the costs of additional health care 
requirements because of stress and so on. Redundancies reduce a jurisdiction’s 
tax revenues because people without jobs do not generally earn taxable 
income and don’t spend as much. One hard-to-calculate cost of redundancy is 
the effect on the morale of remaining workers. Those in charge of water 
companies are often incentivised to cut operating costs. In effect this means 
that director's remuneration is likely to increase the more efficiencies through 
redundancy are made. As mentioned above Scottish Water has lost over a third 
of its workforce since its creation in 2002. 
 
4 Consultants, Reports and Legal Fees 
 
Privatisation programmes have been organised and directed by an 'influential 
technocracy of economists and accountants'.136 Privatisation consultants and 
advisors, drawn predominately from the ranks of Big Four accountancy firms 
and investment banks, became central figures in the 'neo-liberal alliance'137 
that implemented privatisation ideology. Their activities range from advising 
governments on how to 'reform' public sectors, to performing valuations of 
state-owned enterprises, to designing privatisation plans, to overseeing tender 
offers, negotiated sales, stock floatation’s, joint ventures, management-
employee buyouts and a myriad of other types of privatisations.  
 
Accounting firms have been at the heart of government policy development 
for lucrative PPP/PFI or privatisation contracts. Their secondees work in 
government departments that devise, negotiate, and drive privatisation 
policy.138 For example, in 1997 the Treasury created a Taskforce to encourage 
PFI. This was led by a merchant banker supported by a small team of experts 
from the private sector. These experts included personnel from leading 
accountancy firms, who briefed civil servants and provided 'in-depth training 
                                                 
134 Lobina, E., ‘UK Water Privatization: a Briefing’ Public Services International, University of 
Greenwich, February 2001 (http://www.psiru.org/reports/2001-02-W-UK-over.doc)  
135 ibid 
136 Arnold and Cooper,  A Tale of Two Classes: The Privatisation of Medway Ports’, Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 10, Number 2, April 1999, pp. 127-152(26); Academic Press ; 
Martin 1993: 2. 
137 Martin, 1993: 6 
138 ‘A web of private interest: how the Big Five accountancy firms influence and profit from 
privatisation policy’ UNISON,. June, 2002,  http://www.unison.org.uk/acrobat/B362.pdf 
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in privatisation and more recently in Private Finance Initiative (PFI) project 
management, project finance and negotiating skills'.139 
 
The major accounting firms train civil servants in 'accounting evaluations 
techniques and methodologies' and have helped introduce commercial 
investment appraisal to the public sector. They devise and run so-called value 
for money calculations, which in effect often obscure the essential but difficult 
to measure social costs of the implementation of privatisation. Thus, for 
privatisation development and evaluation the government has relied on firms 
with a direct commercial interest in these policies. 
 
5 The Costs of the Regulator 
 
The office of the Water Industry Commission for Scotland had total 
expenditures of over £3.8 million in the year to April 2006, with £1.28 million 
spent on staff remuneration, £421,241 on general operating costs, £702,770 on 
the strategic review of charges, £881,388 on licensing, and £232,785 on 
consultancy projects.140 As indicated above much of the latter expenditures 
will have been on professional consultancy fees for lawyers and accountants. 
In this accounting period the WIC actually recorded a net deficit of £130,061. 
 
An important issue for utility regulators is that of transfer pricing. Clearly all 
organisations (public and private) should be audited. In the case of privatised 
water companies, they are audited twice. Once by the normal accounting firm 
who will sign off their accounts to say that they show a true and fair view of 
the company. However, because of things like transfer pricing, privatised 
utilities will have to be audited by the public regulator. The following example 
explains why. 
 
The regulator is concerned with the regulated part of any private company. So 
let us suppose that Company A is a privatised water company. Company A 
decides to set up an insurance division. The regulator will only be concerned 
with the water division of the business not the insurance part. Suppose that 
Company A’s best quote for insuring its infrastructure is £100. Now that 
Company A has its own insurance business it decides to go 'in-house' to 
provide insurance cover. Company A is aware that it is under the scrutiny of 
the regulator and it is also aware that it is ensured a guaranteed rate of return 
on its water business. The smart thing for it to do would be to charge itself 
(say) £10,000 for insurance that would normally cost its water arm £100. The 
company can then make huge profits (unregulated) in its insurance business 
while making the maximum return allowed by the regulator in its water 
business. 
 
The job of the regulator in such a scenario would be difficult. How much time 
should the regulator spend checking all of the inter-company transactions? 
Clearly in a privatised situation, this regulation and scrutiny of transfer prices 
would be necessary (but also very costly). In a public sector setting incentives 
                                                 
139 ibid. 
140 Water Industry Commission for Scotland (2006) Annual Report, SE 2006 / 84, June, p. 36.  
(http://www.watercommissioner.co.uk/Documents/Publications/Annual%20Report%202005-06.pdf)  
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to (ab)use transfer pricing could be entirely removed therefore making the 
costs of regulation much cheaper. 
 
6 Other potential human costs 
 
In other industries, privatisation has produced the following 'human' problems: 
• Private firms routinely under-staff facilities.141 
• Private firms boost profits by paying inferior wages 
• Privatisation often jeopardises high quality services. The goal of profit 
maximisation isn’t the same as providing the best service. 
• The lower wages and benefits that private firms offer lead to less-
qualified staff and lower employee retention rates. 
• Privatisation erodes living standards in the local community.  
 
7 Privatisation leads to loss of flexibility 
 
Under privatisation expertise in running the water industry is passed to the 
private sector. When consumers complain about a contracted service, the 
government becomes a 'middleman' who can often do little more than 
complain in turn to the contractor or enter into costly contract renegotiations 
or termination proceedings.  
 
After a few years, government will only have to option of offering the contract 
to another private company: 'in-house' public sector expertise will have been 
lost. This can also lead to the erosion of a 'public service' ethos in the 
privatised water sector. Moreover, the water market in a mature economy like 
Scotland's is very attractive to transnational corporations (TNC’s). This can 
often mean less investment and higher prices plus the flight of the dividends 
overseas. 
 
8 The Burden of Risk 
 
Private companies seek to minimise risk. This partially explains the popularity 
of Public Private partnerships (PPPs) and models of mutualisation. 
Experiences across the world have demonstrated the ability of private 
companies to negotiate tight contacts with guaranteed revenue but with the 
ultimate risk lying with the owners, usually either the state or 
members/customers.  The risk bearer of last resort in a key sector like water 
will always be the government, given the inelasticity of demand for water and 
associated essential services. 
 
 
This section has briefly considered some of the hidden costs of privatisation.  For 
those who wish to imagine other options, the next sections discuss various policies.
                                                 
141 Cooper and Taylor, “Independently Verified Reductionism: Prison Privatization in Scotland”, 
Human Relations, April 2005. pp 467 - 522 
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Policy Options: Mutualisation  
 
The concept of a mutual water company has attracted much attention and some 
support in Scotland in recent years. There appears to be a notion that mutualisation is 
a modern panacea to the issues facing the Scottish water sector, and that mutualisation 
offers a policy compromise between the alleged inefficiency of the public sector and 
the worst aspects of unfettered privatisation.  
 
Most of the debate on the merits of mutualisation for the water industry in Scotland 
has been characterised by a conspicuous lack of detail on what such a policy would 
mean in practice. For instance, one MSP recently remarked that at a meeting on water 
services in Glasgow that 'not…all mutualisation corresponds to privatisation. If done 
properly it can mean mutual investment in mutual assets'142 
 
The key questions that arise from this kind of argument are who has the resources and 
capacity to invest in mutual assets, how would this investment be subscribed, and how 
would the governance and management of a mutual organisation deliver high quality 
water services at reasonable prices to Scottish water users? Attached to this are 
critical questions about the governance and accountability of a mutual water company 
in Scotland. 
 
A core issue is that of investment. The only obvious sources of funding for investment 
in a mutual water company in Scotland are from public funds or the private sector. 
Essentially, the devolution settlement allows the Scottish Executive to spend the 
block grant from the UK Treasury as it chooses. But there are many competing calls 
on this funding. The Scotland Act (1998) does allow the Executive to raise taxes by 
3%. But heretofore the Executive has strongly resisted calls to raise taxes and it is 
highly unlikely that it would choose to do so, even to support important public 
services like water. The devolution settlement means that the Scottish Executive is not 
allowed to borrow money.143 So, with no possibility of borrowing, very little chance 
of tax rises, and scant appetite to push up water prices to pay for mutualisation we are 
left with the likelihood that only the private sector will be in a position to invest in 
                                                 
142 Ballard, M, 'Water privatisation' (2006). http://www.markballard.org.uk/index.php?/archives/11-
Water-Privatisation.html#extended. 
143 Scottish Ministers have no powers to raise extra resources by borrowing or sanctioning borrowing. 
They may borrow sums from the Secretary of State for Scotland in accordance with section 66 of the 
Scotland Act 1998 but only to meet temporary shortfalls of cash, or to provide a working balance in the 
Scottish Consolidated Fund (SCF). Scottish Ministers may borrow money only under this power or 
under powers conferred by separate Acts of the UK Parliament. Section 67 of the Scotland Act makes 
provision for HM Treasury to issue sums by way of a loan to the Secretary of State out of the National 
Loans Fund (NLF) in order to make loans to Scottish Ministers. Repayments from Scottish Ministers to 
the Secretary of State are a charge on the SCF and are not therefore subject to authorisation by the 
Parliament.  
Under the Statement of Funding Policy, which defines the financial relationships between the devolved 
administrations and the UK Government, Scottish Ministers may sanction borrowing for capital 
investment by local authorities and other public bodies. However, this borrowing, excluding short-term 
borrowing (ie less than a year), counts towards the United Kingdom Public Sector Net Cash 
Requirement (PSNCR) and hence is included within the Scottish Administration's Assigned Budget 
each year as a control mechanism so that any increases in borrowing must be offset by reductions in 
other spending. Scottish Ministers also possess powers to lend money 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Government/Finance/spfm/borrowingetc 
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mutualisation. Then the conditions of the investment would have to be such to allow a 
return on investment, or profits, which is precisely what a mutual model is meant to 
avoid. 
 
As Unison has argued: 
 
Mutualisation for the capital intensive Scottish water and sewage industry is 
simply a smokescreen for privatisation. The mutual body would in effect be 
owned by the financial institutions that provided (the more expensive) capital 
funds. To minimise financial risk they would insist that all services be 
provided by private contractors…Therefore the so-called mutual option is in 
reality a token representation for customers on a board overseeing a wholly 
privatised Scottish Water.144 
 
In an ideal world a consumer mutual would give ownership and control of core 
monopoly assets to those users and communities dependent upon the service 
provided.145  Membership of the mutual would extend to customers (domestic and 
non-domestic in the case of water) and employees. There would be no separate 
shareholders on whose behalf manager's act. Theoretically, mutual’s are open and 
democratic. Members are entitled to receive information and meaningfully participate 
in the governance of the organisation, leading to enhanced openness and 
accountability. As such mutualisation offers the possibility of a more participative 
form of democracy.146 Despite government rhetoric in support of more diverse forms 
of participation in decision-making, real progress appears very limited. These rather 
intangible benefits of mutualisation have been endorsed by the Prime Minister:  
 
Common ownership and management of the water industry would represent a 
bold move in building relationships based on mutual understanding and equal 
treatment and creating ‘social capital’, what the Prime Minister has 
summarised as 'the capacity to get things done, to co-operate, the magic 
ingredient that makes all the difference.147  
 
Governance of a mutual is critical to realising the magic of co-operation. The 
literature on mutuals suggest that such organisations should be led by a board of 
highly skilled and credit-worthy individuals, who would be directly accountable to 
members, and responsible for daily operations. Operational control of the mutual 
would focus on the provision of quality water and sewerage services at the lowest 
possible cost, aided by the ‘rapid introduction of new technology, a permanent 
lifelong learning programme to upgrade’.148  
 
The highly capital intensive water industry means that funds, other than those 
generated through surplus from charges, have to be raised via long-term debt rather 
                                                 
144 UNISON Water Brief, http://www.unison-scotland.org.uk/water/waterbrief.html 
145 'What Future for Scotland’s Water? The Mutual Answer', Scottish Co-operative and Mutual Forum, 
Forum Focus (Issue 2) 
146 ‘Scottish Water The Case For a Peoples Company with Mutual Ownership and Management’, 
Social Enterprise Institute , June 2001 
147 As quoted in Hargreaves, I. ‘New Mutualism in from the Cold’, London, Co-operative Press Ltd. 
1999,  p. 12 
148 Social Enterprise Institute, ibid. 
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than equity, which is characteristic of privatised water companies. Such debt is 
secured against assets. The mutual would not diversify into other areas of the 
industry.  
 
Whilst the possibility of a customer co-operative was considered by the Scottish 
Parliament149 it was rejected in favour of the formation of Scottish Water from the 
amalgamation of the three regional water authorities. The recent calls for privatisation 
and the legislated introduction of competition in water services for non-domestic 
customers have reopened discussion around the model upon which water services 
could be provided in Scotland.  
 
Model Mutualisation? Welsh Water  
There are no examples of successful water mutual’s in the UK. A few years ago 
Yorkshire Water considered the possibility of mutualisation, though the benefits 
arising from this scheme were to flow to private investors, who were expected to 
benefit by £2.5bn. The Lex column of the Financial Times noted 'from the 
shareholders’ point of view, spinning the water and waste assets into a mutual, 
financed entirely by debt, is all gravy'150 while 'Kelda [the parent company of 
Yorkshire Water] would realise £2.4bn – more than five times the 1989 purchase 
price – from the sale of the water business’s assets built up by generations of 
taxpayers and consumers'.  
 
Kelda’s proposal was rejected by the then Director General of Water Services, Sir Ian 
Byatt (Chair of the Water Industry Commission for Scotland). Byatt made clear he 
was not opposed in principle the separation of ownership of assets and operation of 
services. He added that these new ownership forms could be accepted if the customer 
would benefit through increased competition, increasing choice, and/or through the 
lowering of prices.  
 
Welsh Water is the mutual model most cited in discussion of water policy options in 
Scotland. In response to a series of regulator imposed price cuts Welsh Water 
proposed the acquisition of its assets by a new not-for-profit, Glas Cymru. The latter 
company was established through securitisation, where debt finance is secured against 
the assets to ensure ownership and control of Welsh Water in ‘the best interests of 
Welsh Water, its customers and the environment’.151 OFWAT approved the sale of 
Welsh Water's assets to the not-for-profit company,152 encouraged by support from 
the devolved Welsh Assembly. This sell-off raised £2billion on the bond market. 
 
The new asset-owning company was limited by guarantee, with no shareholders 
seeking dividends from operational surpluses. Instead any surplus was retained, and 
                                                 
149 Birchall, J. ‘A Mutual Trend: How to run water and rail in the public interest’  
 2002, p.10  
150 Lex Column, ‘Water into wine’, Financial Times , 15 June 2001 
151 ‘Clas Cymru plans for Welsh Water’ 
(http://www.dwrcymru.com/English/library/Reports/companyreports/glascymru/plans/plansforww.pdf)  
152 The sale was approved on the following conditions: there would be effective regulation by the 
Drinking Water Inspectorate and the Environment Agency; the company was committed to reducing 
customer’s bills, activities of the new company were limited to water and sewerage services; ‘objective 
measures of performance’ on the quality and levels of customers’ bills; and the company would focus 
on commercial success 
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possibly returned, to benefit the customers of Welsh Water,153 which amounted to a 
customer dividend of £19 in 2006. Put simply, Glas Cymru was established to own, 
finance and manage Welsh Water; the latter was charged with carrying out the day-to-
day activities via special contract partners employed by Welsh Water following a 
competitive procurement process. Welsh Water only employs 152 people directly, 
whilst being ‘at the heart of an ‘Asset Management Alliance’ with approximately 
3,000 people from 15 different organisations.154  
 
Under this new corporate form Welsh Water’s capital investment programmes are 
financed by bonds and retained financial surpluses. Additional savings have funded 
some discretionary investment in service improvements. However, to date financial 
efficiency savings have largely been used to build up reserves to insulate Welsh 
Water and its customers from any unexpected costs in the future, and to improve its 
credit rating to keep the costs of future financing as low as possible.  
 
Membership of Glas Cymru extends beyond the Directors of the company. Presently 
there are 57 members. Rather than being democratically elected, as recommended by 
the theory of mutualisation, members are selected according to process overseen by 
an Independent Membership Selection Panel that is required to maintain a balanced 
and diverse membership. Glas Cymru is under pressure from the National Assembly 
for Wales to develop a more democratic constitution.  
 
The experience in Wales suggests models of ‘mutualisation’ do not simply translate 
into common ownership by customers and employees. A recent review of the policy 
options surrounding ‘mutuatlisation’ emphasises the importance of stakeholder 
representation and democratic accountability. In particular, the legal form and the key 
features of membership rights are crucial to understanding how mutualisation actually 
works. So too are the definitions of membership and representation mechanisms open 
to stakeholders in the governance structure.155  
 
The Scottish Parliament rejected the idea of a single-stakeholder mutual for Scottish 
Water because they were not convinced that consumers would want to participate in 
the long term.156 The extension of the statutory powers of WaterWatch Scotland has 
been seen as a way of seeking to safeguard customer interests. 
 
Mutual membership could be offered to customers, given they represent a relatively 
stable and homogeneous group. Such a scheme would most likely be implemented by 
issuing shares to existing customers. However, the weighting of such an offer could 
favour business customers’ over domestic customers, given the formers greater use of 
the business. Shareholders could then vote representatives on to the board and 
participation costs would be low since information-distribution and voting could be 
linked to billing.  
 
                                                 
153 Glas Cymru (http://www.dwrcymru.com/English/Company/Glascymru/index.asp)   
154 Glas Cymru (2006), Report and Accounts 2006, p. 15 
155 The options are non-member non-profit; single stakeholder non-profit; single stakeholder mutual; 
multi-stakeholder non-profit; multi-stakeholder mutual. For more detail see Birchall, J. (2002) A 
Mutual Trend: How to run water and rail in the public interest  
156 Ibid p.10 
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The key problems associated with this model arise from the need to develop a 
continuing strategy for the board and management that would involve members and 
avoid capture by a particular interest group. All interests would not be represented if 
only customers, as a single stakeholder group, were to form the body of members. For 
instance, how would workers and environmental interests be represented? Also, any 
financial surpluses could be divided among customers possibly leading to conflicts 
between different types of users. 
 
Currently, Scottish Water remains in the public sector in terms of ownership and 
strategic direction. The capital investment programme it undertakes and the services it 
provides have, or are on the verge, of being opened up to private sector interests 
seeking to profit from a relatively captive and stable group of customers. There is 
considerable pressure for profit and economic efficiency within the industry prompted 
by the economic regulator. However, the issue of financing the investment required in 
the industry remains. Debt financing is more attractive for ‘mutualised’ companies. 
However financing from government bonds is still cheaper. Given that water and 
wastewater services are crucial for public health and socio-economic development, is 
it better to develop an organisation which can fund investment through the cheapest 
means possible and where multiple interests are represented? To ensure democratic 
accountability the organisation should remain in the public sector where other 
interests can be represented through Parliament. Water is not simply about customers 
seeking the cheapest possible water services. Water users are also citizens who may 
be concerned with social equity and environmental justice. Mutualisation can make 
such objectives more difficult to achieve in practice.  
 
Reviewing the lessons from privatisation of water in England and Wales Shaoul 
points to the 'unviability' of the policy. There are clear warnings that mutualisation is 
not a solution to privatisation:  
 
‘If the regulator allows prices to rise…this in turn would generate the political 
outcry that the regulation was supposed to prevent…Thus the turn to 
mutualisation, far from representing a return to a form of public ownership, 
represents an exit strategy for the infrastructure industries and a mechanism 
for evading price regulation, at the expense of the consumers’.157  
 
While local communities should have the right to choose how their water is delivered, 
the reality is that the range of choices continues to be narrowed by factors outside 
local control. Any further reorganisation of the Scottish water sector should prioritise 
the following: 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
                                                
accountability – through information and openness to public participation 
regarding financing, safe water (public health), environmental protection  
public involvement throughout operation and investment 
acceptance of the political nature of water discussions and that political 
support is  necessary for the public sector model to develop and flourish 
Charging  
• Charge on volume of water used 
• Subsidies for the poor 
 
157 Shaoul, J. ‘Tapping into Mutuals’, Public Finance, (2000) 
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• Need highly educated technical experts in the public authority 
• Sense of shared responsibility for the common good 
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Policy Options: Democratising Scottish Water   
 
There appears to be a general erosion of the public sector ethos of common ownership 
across key sections of Scottish public life. Pundits, experts and other assorted 
commentators repeat the mantra of 'public bad, private good' in many different 
spheres of policy. In the water sector this can be seen as leading to a gradual 
acceptance of the commodification of water. The encroachment of the private sector 
on Scottish Water can be seen at many different levels. For example the skills base 
within the public arm of the water industry is being downsized and out-sourced. This 
loss of expertise inevitably makes Scottish Water increasingly dependent on private 
companies. This also begs the question as to whether a public service should be run 
by managers incentivised to produce efficiency savings, which is often a euphemism 
for redundancies. Whether customers of Scottish Water would see the reduced 
workforce, and persistent problems with leaks, repairs and service, as evidence of a 
more 'efficient' industry is not something that Scottish Water or the WIC have much 
to say about.  
 
Financing is a key challenge for every community wanting to ensure water for all. 
The day-to-day running of a water utility comes at a cost and expanding access to 
water requires investment. There are principally two ways to pay for public water 
delivery: taxes or user fees; charges for operations and taxes for capital investment. 
Overcoming financial obstacles to the expansion of water delivery can be done by 
reducing operational costs and increasing efficiency. By ambitiously taking on 
leakages and improving billing, lower shares of non-revenue water can be achieved 
and financial viability of the utility can be improved. Delete?? 
 
Citizen participation can help the financial health of the water utility. They are not 
only empowered by the government to prioritise the allocation of public funds, but are 
also involved in monitoring implementation of decisions and projects. Close and 
continuous scrutiny of water utilities and of external contractors has helped to reduce 
costs of new construction projects. It is clear that Scotland has much to learn from 
other parts of the world on how water services can be made more accountable and 
efficient. We would argue strongly that real accountability and efficiency are 
intimately linked.158  
 
Case Study: Stockholm Vatten 
Public water and sanitation utilities have traditionally been managed by the 290 
municipalities in Sweden.159 Municipal water supply and sewerage works (MWSW) 
are separate accounting administrations, which are not allowed under law to be 
operated by a profit margin and are solely funded by connection fees and operation 
charges. MWSWs are seen to be a societal concern, under the municipality’s 
responsibility for health protection.  
 
                                                 
158 W. Dinan, C. Malcolm, D. Miller and A. Watterson ‘Openness in Scottish Water: A review of 
Consultation, customer relations and communications in the Scottish Water industry’ Water Customer 
Consultation Panels (WCCPS), (2003) 
159 Gustafsson, ‘Public Water Utilities and Privatisation in Scottish Water  eden’, Working Paper, 
presented EPSU Public Service Conference, Brussels, 12 December 2001 
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The city council sets requirements for water and wastewater services, these objectives 
relate to operations alongside financial and economic objectives160. The City 
Executive Board is also responsible for implementing the resolutions. Stockholms 
Stadhus AB is a special division of Stockholm City’s Executive Office161, which has a 
central and strategic role in the government of Stockholm and is responsible for the 
control, follow-up and development of the City’s activities. In addition, the Executive 
Office makes sure the political decisions are implemented.  Stockholm Vatten AB is 
owned directly by the City of Stockholm (7%), by Stockholms Stadhus AB (91%) and 
by the municipality of Huddinge (2%). The Stockholm Water Company (aka 
‘Stockholm Vatten’), founded in 1990, is owned by Stockholm City and Hiddinge 
municipality.  
 
The Stockholms Stadhus AB group is the parent company for Stockholm City’s 
companies. Stockholm City Council approves the companies’ articles of associations, 
appoints their board members, and issues directives for the company. The City 
Council also determines the bases of the fees to be levied by the company for such 
services as water supply and wastewater treatment. The parent company is 
responsibly for the Group’s overall development and strategic planning as well as the 
management of the Group’s economic and financial resources162. The Board is 
composed of the ordinary members and trade union representatives, whose 
professions and memberships to political parties, trade unions and of other boards is 
outlined.  
 
Stockholm Vatten (also known as Stockholm Water Company) produce and deliver 
drinking water to approximately one million people in Stockholm, Huddinge and nine 
neighbouring municipalities; alongside the management and treatment of wastewater 
from Stockholm, Huddigne and six neighbouring municipalities. SWC will ensure 
supplies of good-quality drinking water to households and enterprises in Stockholm 
and treat the wastewater produced in the area in accordance with stringent safety and 
environmental standards.163 
 
Despite having a monopoly position SWC and no competition the company states it 
‘must operate in a rational and customer-orientated manner and maintain high quality 
standards so that our services provide good value for money’. The company states it is 
making every effort to reduce resource utilization and increase cost-effectiveness, for 
example, by increasing the percentage of operations put out to public tender. Such 
activities, gives some indication of the commercialisation of activities within the 
public sector model. To evaluate performance and give an indication of where 
improvements can be made, SWC uses key indicators for prices, quality and quantity 
with other companies in Sweden and the Nordic countries. 
 
                                                 
160 Stenroos, M. and Katko, T.S.) WaterTime case study – Stockholm Sweden (PSIRU) (2005) 
(www.watertime.net/docs/WP2/D38_Stockholm.do)  
161 The City of Stockholm’s Executive Office is one of two administrative bodies staffed by civil 
servants and is part of the City Executive Board which is “Stockholm’s government’. (Stockholm Stad) 
(http://www2.stockholm.se/english/pdf/F_engelsk.pdf#search=%22stockholm%3A%20democracy%20
in%20images%20and%20words%22)  
162 The City of Stockholm,( http://www2.stockholm.se/english/) 
163 ‘Stockholm Vatten, ‘A year with the Stockholm Water Company and a century with Norsburg 
waterworks’, Environmental and Annual Report 2004.  
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Charges for Water and Sewage Services (from 1 January 2006)164  
 
According to Swedish law, SV is a non-profit public company. Business activities are 
funded from rates charges levied for drinking water, sewage treatment and other 
services, which are calculated in accordance with the cost price principle under the 
Public Water Supply and Wastewater Systems Act165. Specifically, the municipal 
council establishes principles for the system of rates and the Board of SV, consisting 
of Ordinary members and Trade Union representatives, fixes the scale of rates. 
Charges are not subsidised from taxes in any other way. Charges are classified into 
the following categories and include variable, fixed and storm-water charges166 
including 25% Value Added Tax: 
- 
- 
- 
                                                
detached houses and other small buildings 
residential buildings and non-residential buildings 
industrial and other property 
 
 Financial Issues  
 
In 1995, SWC underwent a major reorganisation aimed to enhance operating 
efficiency and long-term sustainable development, through cost recovery rather than 
profit maximisation. Financial transactions were centralised under, and financial risks 
largely taken over by, Stockholm City in 2000. These risks include the different 
companies’, within the Stockholm Stadhus AB Group financing risk and the credit 
risks, counterparty risks and liquidity risks associated with financial transactions. The 
interest rate risk is borne by the companies themselves, whilst all significant currency 
risks are to be eliminated by the use of derivative instruments. Such risks are 
connected to the company’s financial viability is based on the stability of the 
operating conditions which are generally characteristic of water supply and 
sewerage.167 In addition SWC must comply with various statutory and administrative 
instruments which are monitored by different agencies168.  
 
 
164 Stockholm Vatten (2006) Charges: Water and Sewage Services in Stockholm and Huddinge from 1 
January 2006 (Summary)  http://www.stockholmvatten.se/pdf_arkiv/charges.pdf  
165 Stockholm Vatten (2004: 33) 
166 This is an environmental charge paid by customers who use the Stockholm Vatten pipe system for 
diverting rainwater and water from melting snow from the property. Stockholm Vatten encourages 
property owners to handle storm-water locally on the premises. Thus if the storm-water can be dealt 
with inside the site boundary, property owners can apply for a 50 or 100 percent reduction of the 
charge (Stockholm Vatten, 2006: 3).  
167 As quoted in Lobina, E., and Hall, D. ‘Public Sector Alternatives to Water Supply and Sewerage 
Privatisation: Case Studies’, PSIRU Report, (1999: 9) 
168 SWC must comply with statutory and administrative instruments, from national legislation as well 
as being influenced by the EU Water Framework Directive and Urban Wastewater Directive. The 
Stockholm Environmental and Health Administration and corresponding departments in other 
municipalities are responsible for external supervision and inspections of drinking water, as well as 
monitoring the impact of SWC’s activities on the water environment. The Swedish Environmental 
Protection Agency formulates Sweden’s national environmental objectives, whilst the environmental 
courts establish the requirements concerning the environmental results of wastewater treatments. 
Finally, the Stockholm County Administrative Board supervised the company’s compliance with the 
treatment requirements. Noticeably, an economic regulator is missing from this regulatory framework 
possibly due to the financial limits and directives laid down with Stockholm City Council. Stockholm 
Vatten (2004: 7)  
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The Swedish municipal service seems quite competitive with reference to statistics 
from IWSA (International Service Water Association).169 The average price or 200 
cubic metres drinking water was less that half the price of most other European cities 
(some comparative prices are outlined below in Table 1). The low water charges are 
available despite Sweden lacking scale advantages given its small population sparsely 
populated around the country.  
 
City  Euro 
Amsterdam 153 
Geneva 322 
Helsinki 174 
London 140 
Marseille 256 
Gothenburg 80 
Swedish average  105 
 
Average prices for 200 m3 drinking water in some EU cities 
 
There is further evidence of the advantages of the Swedish model (based on a study 
by consultancy firm ITT in 1995).170 The study surveyed the economic performance 
indicators in three public works in Sweden and six private water supply works in 
England and Wales. Some of the key measures are reproduced below: 
 
City Cost to 
customer 
Cost of 
operation 
Capital 
Maintenance 
Return on 
Capital 
Stockholm 0.28 0.17 0.03 0.09 
Manchester 0.91 0.40 0.20 0.31 
Bristol 0.83 0.48 0.19 0.15 
     
Gothenburg 0.38 0.11 0.05 0.21 
Kirklees 0.99 0.52 0.31 0.15 
Hartlepool 0.73 0.35 0.08 0.29 
     
Helsingborg 0.42 0.42 0.05 -0.05 
Waverly  0.82 0.48 0.22 0.12 
Wrexham 1.25 0.57 0.35 0.32 
     
Average – 
Sweden 
0.36 0.23 0.04 0.08 
Average – 
UK 
0.93 0.48 0.20 0.23 
Table 1: Comparison of economic performance indicators of public and private 
water supply works/companies in some Swedish and English cities. Cost per 
cubic meter of water delivered in USD. 
 
Scotland & Ireland  
                                                 
Gustafsson, J-E.‘Public Water Utilities and Privatisation in Scottish Water Eden’, Working Paper, 
presented EPSU Public Service Conference, Brussels, 12 December 2001, p,3 
170 ibid: 4 
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When considering alternatives to the present governance structure of Scottish Water it 
is easy to slip into comparators with the most obvious comparison, which is of course 
England and Wales, but why do the WIC and the Scottish Executive not even attempt 
to look elsewhere for new models?  Why do we look to England and Wales almost 
exclusively?  Perhaps it is to do with proximity, both culturally and geographically, 
but a more persuasive view might be that the model of privatisation in England, or 
Wales, is the model that is the ultimate goal for the WIC and the Scottish Executive.  
Another model that is geographically close is that of Ireland’s water supply.  
Politically and organisationally, however, it seems very far away indeed.  In Ireland, 
like in Scotland, there are European directives to be adhered to, but unlike in Scotland 
the managing of the water supply is accomplished by local authorities.  The Irish are 
devolving this responsibility to locales themselves with local knowledge being 
utilised in the process. Moreover, it is funded through general taxation, albeit with 
major assistance from EU structural funds.  This seems to be placing water very much 
as a fundamental human right.  It is also anathema to current political thinking in 
Scotland, whereby the investment and operation of water is funded predominately 
from the water user and to a lesser extent from Scottish Executive loans.   
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Conclusions 
 
The Scottish Water industry has been set up in a governance context and regulatory 
framework, which inevitably tends towards privatisation.  This is predominantly 
because of the following factors: 
1. The international financial and governance context creates pressures for market 
based solutions. 
2. The devolution settlement constrains the Scottish Executive raising revenue to 
invest in infrastructure. 
3. The governance model for the industry treats Scottish Water as if it was a private 
company 
4. The financial accounting methods used by the WIC  (the RCV method) lock 
Scottish Water into a model which enables returns to private investors 
 
The trend towards privatisation is supported by campaigns from political parties, think 
tanks and other pro business lobbyists. The Scottish water industry is part of a global 
water industry. It is the governance and regulation system which inevitably pushes the 
water industry in a direction which makes privatisation seem a rational, least worst (or 
profitable) policy option.   
 
But in fact on every major index, privatisation of water across the world has been a 
failure in terms of its value for money, the accountability of the service, sustainability 
and water quality and efficiency.  There is every reason to suppose that the same 
would be the case in Scotland.  
 
The major potential alternative to privatisation is mutualisation.  Some critics have 
denounced this as privatisation by the back door and it is our view, based on evidence 
assembled for this report, that such a view is justified in relation to Scottish Water.  
This is predominantly because there is currently only one likely source for investment 
finance in a mutual model: the private sector.  In practice financial institutions would 
have the whip hand in the governance system and in practical decision making in the 
Scottish water sector. 
 
The only way to ensure that Scottish Water is saved from privatisation is by turning 
away from the current market model towards a democratisation of the industry.  This 
is also the only way to ensure an efficient, sustainable and equitable water system in 
Scotland. 
 
Key characteristics of a democratised water industry 
While local communities should have the right to choose how their water is delivered, 
the reality is that the range of choices continues to be narrowed by factors outside 
local control. Any further reorganisation of the Scottish water sector should prioritise 
the following: 
 
- 
- 
- 
accountability – through information and openness to public participation 
regarding financing, safe water (public health), environmental protection  
public involvement throughout operation and investment  
enable cross-subsidy of public services  
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- 
- 
                                                
public awareness and reluctance to privatise communicated through 
campaigns and media 
acceptance of the political nature of water discussions and that political 
support is  necessary for the public sector model to develop and flourish 
Charging  
• Charge on volume of water used 
• Subsidies for the poor 
• Association with cost of operation and maintenance in particular locations 
– a political decision needs to be made 
• Need highly educated technical experts in the public authority 
• Sense of shared responsibility for the common good 
 
In many respects political support for public water is a priority: 
 
The need for local public authorities to be given support in their efforts 
towards establishing an innovative, participatory, democratic system of public 
water management that is efficient, transparent and regulated and that respects 
the objectives of sustainable development in order to meet the population’s 
needs.171  
 
Scottish Water could be democratised.  This requires that it is put firmly into public 
ownership, meaning that Scottish Water operates not as if it was a private corporation, 
but as a public service.  It would not be required to prioritise market efficiency over 
social or environmental efficiency.  The investment needed could be most efficiently 
achieved by cutting out the profit guaranteed to the financial markets and the other 
hidden costs of a market or privatised model. Most importantly the control over 
decisions in the delivery of safe, sustainable water would rest not at the whim of the 
market but with the people of Scotland.   
 
 
171 Balanyá, B, Brennan, B, Hoedeman, O,  Kishimoto, S and Terhorst, P (eds), ‘Reclaiming Public 
Water Achievements, Struggles and Visions from Around the World’, Transnational Institute and 
Corporate Europe Observatory, January 2005 (1rst edition) March 2005 (2nd edition) 
 
 49
 Appendix 1 
 
Some Key Facts about Scottish Water172   
  
Assets Thousands of assets are operated and maintained - over 46,000 
kilometres of water pipes, 48,000 kilometres of sewer pipes, 1807 
waste water treatment works (including 1274 septic tanks) and 368 
water treatment works plus pumping stations, sludge treatment 
centres, reservoirs. 
Customers Scottish Water  has around 5 million customers in 2.2million 
households. Business customers number 133,000, the majority being 
small to medium businesses with 490 large industrial and 
commercial users.  
Water 
Quality  
Over 800 water samples are taken every day from a combination of 
customer taps, water treatment works and service reservoirs. 
Between January to December 2003 over 306,000 regulatory tests 
were carried out to ensure water quality is maintained to rigorous 
drinking water quality standards. 
Volumes 2.5 billion litres of water is provided every day and nearly 1 billion 
litres of waste water is taken away and treated before being returned 
to the rivers and seas. 
Coastline Scottish Water  is the sole provider of water and waste water services 
to an area of 78,000 square kilometres (over 30,000 square miles), a 
third of the area of Britain. And Scotland has a longer coastline - 
almost 10,000 kilometres (over 6,200 miles) - with a small and 
relatively dispersed population which requires a large number of 
small water and waste water treatment works. 
Ranking and 
Turnover 
Scottish Water  is the fourth largest water and wastewater services 
provider in the UK and at £1bn it is in Scotland’s list of top 20 
businesses by turnover173.  
 
                                                 
172 ‘Key Facts about Scottish Water’, Scottish Water.co.uk,  
(http://www.scottishwater.co.uk/portal/page?_pageid=225,483607&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL) 
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Appendix 2 
 
How the water industry in Scotland is run174  
 
 
 
 
The Scottish Parliament 
 
Holds Scottish Water and 
Ministers to 
account and regularly calls 
executives to 
its committees to give 
progress updates. 
Scottish Ministers 
Set the objectives and 
appoint the 
Chair and Non-executive 
Directors 
Scottish Water 
 
Responsible for providing 
water and 
waste water services to 
household 
and business customers. 
Delivers the 
investment priorities of 
Ministers within 
the funding allowed by the 
Water 
Industry Commission for 
Scotland. 
 
 
 
Water Industry 
Commission 
for Scotland 
 
Economic regulator. Sets 
charges and 
reports on costs and 
performance. 
 
 
Drinking Water 
Quality Regulator 
 
Responsible for protecting 
public health 
by ensuring compliance 
with drinking 
water quality regulations. 
 
Scottish Environment 
Protection Agency (SEPA) 
 
Responsible for 
environmental protection 
and improvement. 
 
 
Waterwatch Scotland 
 
 
Responsible for 
representing the interests 
of customers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
174 Scottish Water Annual Report 2005/2006, ‘The First Four Years’, 
(http://www.scottishwater.co.uk/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/SWE_PGP_NEWS/0606%20-
%20JUNE%202006/SWE_NEWS_AREPORT06/PRINTED%20ANNUAL%20REPORT.PDF)  
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Appendix 3  
 
Ownership structure of Scottish Water Solutions175 
 
 
 
                                                 
175 Scottish Water  Solutions Annual Report 2005/2006, p39, 
(http://www.scottishwater.co.uk/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/SWS_PUB_ABOUT_US/SWSE_PG_ABOUT
_US/SWS%20_ANN_REP05-06_72.PDF)   
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Appendix 4  
 
Water Knowledge Center 10 Reasons Why … Public Utilities Should Be 
Regulated176 
 
‘Water professionals involved in regulation talked about what their work has taught 
them about regulation. Here are their thoughts on why regulation should extend to 
public utilities’. 
 
 
 
• A regulator will act as a proxy competitor, forcing the utility to 
operate efficiently 
• A regulator can motivate a utility to act on consumer complaints 
• A regulator can be blamed, instead of politicians, if tariffs are raised 
• A regulator can prevent monopoly abuse 
• A regulator can act as a referee between a frustrated public and 
defensive utility 
• A regulator motivates utilities to conduct themselves professionally 
and upgrading their skills in order to present sound reasoning and 
defend their operations to the regulator 
• A regulator can ensure utility sustainability 
• A regulator creates employment 
• A regulator can ensure that utilities make good on their promises, 
such as better service levels 
• A regulator can set realistic limits to ambitious goals of utilities, while 
at the same time expand the public’s sustainability horizon further 
than 3 months at a time 
 
                                                 
176 ‘10 Reasons why public utilities should be regulated’, Asian Development Bank 
(http://www.adb.org/Water/Knowledge-Center/top10-publications.asp)  
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Appendix 5  
 
Illustration of the regulatory role of the WIC177 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
177 ‘Changes to the Economic Regulation of Scottish Water’, Audit Scotland Report ‘Overview of the 
Water Industry in Scotland’, p,13 
(http://www.audit-scotland.gov.uk/publications/pdf/2005/05pf07ag.pdf)  
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Appendix 6 
 
Profile of the WIC178 
 
SIR IAN BYATT, 
CHAIRMAN 
 
Sir Ian Byatt was Director 
General of the Office of 
Water Services (Ofwat) 
between 1989 and 2000. In 
that role he was 
responsible for 
independent 
economic regulation of the 
water 
companies in England & 
Wales. 
From 1978 to 1989 he 
served in 
HM Treasury as Deputy 
Chief 
Economic Adviser. Since 
2000 he has advised the 
World Bank and 
governments around the 
world on matters relating 
to the water industry. Sir 
Ian, who was an adviser to 
the Water Industry 
Commissioner from 2002, 
was knighted in 2000. 
 
PROFESSOR JOHN K 
BANYARD OBE 
Professor Banyard is a 
chartered engineer who 
retired in December 2004 
as an Executive Director 
of Severn Trent Plc 
following a career 
in the water industry. His 
particular areas of 
responsibility were the 
design and management of 
the capital programme, the 
day-to-day 
operation of the 
company’s 
infrastructure, and R&D. 
He also 
acted as an adviser to the 
Water 
Industry Commissioner for 
Scotland from January 
2005. 
 
PROFESSOR DAVID 
SIMPSON, 
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN 
Professor Simpson was 
economic adviser to 
Standard Life from 1988 
to 2001. He was the 
founding Director of the 
Fraser of Allander Institute 
at 
the University of 
Strathclyde and is a 
Trustee of the David 
Hume Institute. Professor 
Simpson acted as an 
adviser to the former 
Water Industry 
Commissioner for 
Scotland from 2002. 
 
DR MIKE BROOKER 
 
Dr Brooker is a scientist 
who recently retired as 
Chief Executive of Welsh 
Water following a career 
in the water 
industry in Wales. During 
his career he was Chief 
Scientist and subsequently 
ALAN SUTHERLAND, 
CHIEF EXECUTIVE 
Alan Sutherland was the 
Water 
Industry Commissioner 
from 
November 1999, when the 
position was created. 
During that time, he 
developed a framework for 
CHARLES 
COULTHARD 
 
Charles Coulthard retired 
recently as Managing 
Director of Ofgem (the 
Gas and Electricity 
regulator) in Scotland. He 
served as Deputy Director 
of the Office for the 
                                                 
178 WIC annual report 2005/20066, P6 
(http://www.watercommission.co.uk/Documents/Publications/Annual%20Report%202005-06.pdf) 
 
 
 
 55
 56
Divisional Operations 
Director of Welsh Water 
before becoming 
Managing Director in 
1996. 
 
economic regulation of 
Scottish Water. He has 
extensive experience in 
management consultancy 
and in the investment 
banking industry, being a 
former management 
consultant with Bain and 
Company and before that a 
Manager with Robert 
Fleming and Company. 
More 
recently he was a 
Managing Director of 
Wolverine CIS Ltd, a 
division of Wolverine 
World Wide. 
 
Regulation of Electricity 
and Gas in Northern 
Ireland between 1992 
and 1999. He is also 
currently the Chair of the 
Gas and Electricity 
Consumers Council in 
Scotland. 
 
 
